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BEYOND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A NEW STATUTORY 
BANKRUPTCY REGIME FOR TRIBAL DEBTORS 
Laura N. Coordes* 
ABSTRACT 
Native American tribes and tribal businesses play an important role in U.S. 
commerce, but many of these entities are effectively prohibited from filing for 
bankruptcy relief when financial distress occurs. This Article demonstrates how 
and why the Bankruptcy Code is a poor fit for these “tribal debtors” and 
suggests that Congress enact a new statutory regime to provide structured debt 
relief for these entities rather than modify the Bankruptcy Code. 
Although this proposal is novel with respect to tribal debtors, Congress has 
looked beyond the Bankruptcy Code to provide debt relief when use of the Code 
would be inapt on two other recent occasions: the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
Act and PROMESA. Using tribal debtors as an example, this Article investigates 
whether and how this practice might continue and what it might mean for the 
bankruptcy system writ large. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a crisis, uncertainty is dangerous and terrifying. Financial crises are no 
different. The events leading to the 2008 recession caused banks—and 
regulators—to panic,1 and U.S. economic policy became unsteady as the Federal 
Reserve and lawmakers struggled to respond.2 In particular, the “shocking” 
collapse of Lehman Brothers set off a “financial tsunami,” which in turn nearly 
“triggered a global financial meltdown.”3  
Similarly, after the Supreme Court in 2016 rejected Puerto Rico’s attempt to 
enact its own form of bankruptcy legislation,4 Puerto Rico teetered on the brink 
of financial collapse. Congress rushed to devise a solution5 in the face of the 
commonwealth’s declaration that it intended to default on significant payment 
obligations, which threatened to trigger “a cycle of hospital closures, electric-
grid instability, infrastructural collapse, and emergency-service breakdowns.”6 
When the next crisis strikes, which entities will be left to face the devastating 
consequences of uncertainty? 
Native American tribes and tribal-affiliated businesses7 (collectively 
referred to as “tribal entities” or “tribal debtors”)8 are playing an increasingly 
 
 1 Kimberly Amadeo, The 2008 Financial Crisis, THE BALANCE (July 1, 2017), https://www.thebalance. 
com/2008-financial-crisis-3305679 (“The mistrust within the banking community was the primary cause of the 
2008 financial crisis.”). 
 2 See John H. Makin, Financial Crises and the Dangers of Economic Policy Uncertainty, AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISE INST. (2012), https://www.aei.org/publication/financial-crises-and-the-dangers-of-economic-
policy-uncertainty/. 
 3 Adam Shell, Lehman Bros. Collapse Triggered Economic Turmoil, ABC NEWS, https://abcnews.go. 
com/Business/lehman-bros-collapse-triggered-economic-turmoil/story?id=8543352. 
 4 Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016). 
 5 Stephen A. Nuno, Congress Passes PROMESA Act for Puerto Rico Debt Crisis, NBC NEWS (June 29, 
2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/congress-passes-promesa-act-puerto-rico-debt-crisis-n601291 
(noting that the vote to pass the bill came two days before Puerto Rico faced a $2 billion debt payment). 
 6 Ed Morales, Who is Responsible for Puerto Rico’s Debt?, THE NATION (June 7, 2016), https://www. 
thenation.com/article/who-is-responsible-for-puerto-ricos-debt/. 
 7 Although this Article primarily discusses tribes and tribal-affiliated businesses together, there are 
distinctions between the two. Tribes or Indian nations are “self-governing sovereigns” that “generally exercise 
powers of self-government.” Karen J. Atkinson & Kathleen M. Nilles, Tribal Business Structure Handbook, 
OFFICE OF INDIAN ENERGY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, II-1 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/tribal_business_structure_handbook.pdf. By contrast, a tribally chartered corporation is “a corporation that 
is organized under a tribal statute or code or pursuant to a resolution of an authorized tribal legislative body.” 
Id. at III-1, III-3. This Article does not address individual Native Americans, who are eligible to file for debt 
relief under chapters 7 or 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. This Article similarly does not address businesses created 
under state law that may have connections to tribes or tribal members, as these businesses are likely able to use 
chapter 11 of the Code. 
 8 Although tribes and tribal businesses are distinct, many of the same problems apply to both in the 
bankruptcy context, in part because tribal businesses are often conflated with tribes themselves, as discussed in 
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significant role in U.S. commerce,9 yet the U.S Bankruptcy Code makes it 
difficult, if not outright impossible, for these entities to use the bankruptcy 
system as debtors. Lack of guidance from the Bankruptcy Code in this area 
creates uncertainty for tribal entities and those that engage in business with them. 
Because tribal entities are increasingly important players in U.S. commerce and 
business, uncertainty as to these entities’ treatment in bankruptcy may make 
them the next victims of an unexpected financial crisis, with consequences that 
could destabilize a significant portion of the American economy. 
Although various observers have expressed concern over a tribal debtor’s 
lack of eligibility for bankruptcy,10 eligibility is only the first hurdle a tribal 
debtor will encounter if it seeks to restructure its debts using the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code. Even if a tribal entity were deemed eligible to file for bankruptcy, the 
Bankruptcy Code conflicts with other federal statutes and policies governing 
Indian nations and their businesses, such as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(“IGRA”). The federal government’s trust relationship with tribes, tribal 
sovereignty, the federal regulatory environment, and other tribal laws and 
customs pose further challenges for prospective tribal debtors. 
These under-explored challenges raise the question of whether tribal entities 
should be eligible for bankruptcy or some sort of structured debt relief in the 
first place. While acknowledging that exclusion of tribal entities from the 
Bankruptcy Code may have been intentional, this Article nevertheless illustrates 
that tribal entities can experience debt overhang and holdout creditors in the 
 
Part I.A. Therefore, this Article refers to both entity types collectively as “tribal entities” or “tribal debtors” 
except when the distinctions between these entities become important. 
 9 Atkinson & Nilles, supra note 7, at I-1 (noting that “[t]ribal governments and tribal businesses engage 
in a wide range of business and financial transactions,” including “tourism, gaming, energy, agriculture, forestry, 
manufacturing, federal contracting, and telecommunications”). 
 10 See, e.g., R. Spencer Clift, III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent 
Dramatic Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy 
Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 181 (2002) (arguing for clarification of a tribe’s status 
under the Bankruptcy Code); Amanda L. Cartwright, Can Native American-Owned Casinos File for Chapter 
11?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2012, at 50, 50 (noting the lack of a “clear insolvency regime” for tribes); Ji Hun 
Kim & Christopher S. Koenig, Rolling the Dice on Debtor Eligibility, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2015, at 18, 19 
(noting that “[I]t is not clear whether Congress would be able to easily amend the Code to provide Native 
American tribes with a source of relief under federal bankruptcy laws”); Stephan A. Hoover, Comment, Forcing 
the Tribe to Bet on the House the Limited Options and Risks to the Tribe when Indian Gaming Operations Seek 
Bankruptcy Relief, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 269 (2013) (arguing that Indian gaming operations should be able to file 
for bankruptcy); Alexander Hogan, Note, Protecting Native American Communities by Preserving Sovereign 
Immunity and Determining the Place of Tribal Businesses in the Federal Bankruptcy Code, 43 COLUM. HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 569 (2012) (discussing the “uncertainty concerning the place of Indian tribes in the federal 
bankruptcy system”); Blake F. Quackenbush, Cross-Border Insolvency & The Eligibility of Indian Tribes to Use 
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61 (2012) (proposing that tribes use chapter 15 of 
the Code to file for bankruptcy). 
COORDESPROOFS_7.2.19 7/2/2019 1:58 PM 
2019] BEYOND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 367 
same way other bankruptcy-eligible entities can. When tribal entities have a need 
for bankruptcy’s unique debt restructuring tools,11 this Article advocates for 
those entities to be deemed eligible to restructure their debt. 
If getting into bankruptcy is the first step, the next step involves determining 
how bankruptcy relief can be fashioned for tribal debtors. Rather than use the 
Code’s ill-fitting law and procedures, this Article proposes an alternative: 
Congress should enact a new statutory regime for tribal debt relief. 
Although special debt relief legislation is a novel proposal with respect to 
tribal entities, it is not unprecedented. In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Act, which provides for an orderly liquidation process for distressed financial 
firms.12 These firms were ineligible to file for relief under the Bankruptcy 
Code.13 And in 2016, Congress enacted special debt restructuring legislation for 
Puerto Rico, another entity that was deemed ineligible for traditional, Code-
based bankruptcy relief.14  
With respect to both banks and Puerto Rico, Congress looked beyond the 
Bankruptcy Code to create laws specifically tailored to these entities and their 
unique attributes.15 Indeed, as this Article will discuss, specialized legislation 
may become a new norm in bankruptcy law, as entities previously not 
contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code pursue options for debt restructuring. 
This Article contends that, like financial firms and U.S. territories, tribal entities 
are differently situated from other debtors covered by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Therefore, if Congress were to consider structured debt relief for tribal entities, 
these entities deserve a distinct form of relief, one that allows these entities to 
concretely address the threat that creditors may destroy ongoing operations. 
 
 11 See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1191, 1206–07 (2017) (describing these tools); see also Matthew A. Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher 
Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697 (2017) (describing bankruptcy tools and applying a framework to evaluate 
whether colleges should be bankruptcy-eligible). 
 12 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
 13 See generally Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks Are Not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985 (2010). 
 14 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (2016). 
 15 In addition to these examples, Congress also passed the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, which 
created a special court and distinct processes for certain U.S. railroads. Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 986 (1974). 
The Act functioned as a “supplement” to the Bankruptcy Act, which predated the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 109 (1974). As a pre-Code law, a full discussion of the Act 
and its impact on bankruptcy at the time is beyond this Article’s scope; for a fuller discussion, see Stephen J. 
Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, 12 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 53, 56–58 (2017). 
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the question of whether 
tribal entities should be eligible for structured debt relief. After probing the 
nature of the problem of excluding tribal debtors from Code-based bankruptcy 
relief, Part I discusses the merits and drawbacks of granting tribal entities access 
to relief before concluding that access to structured debt relief is warranted in 
distinct cases. Part II then explores possible avenues of relief for tribal debtors. 
After surveying existing proposals for granting tribal debtors eligibility for 
bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code, Part II introduces on an alternative path: 
the creation of specialized bankruptcy legislation.  
Part III then explains the process for developing specialized legislation for 
tribes and provides guidance on key features of this proposed bankruptcy relief. 
Significant features include an automatic stay; a voluntary, orderly process for 
debt adjustment and liquidation; exclusivity for tribal debtors to propose a plan; 
use of collective action clauses and other sovereign debt restructuring tools, 
when appropriate; a property distribution scheme that allows for some equity 
retention; strict scrutiny of debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lending; limited 
interference into the debtor’s internal affairs; and an adjudicator to run the 
process and settle disputes. This Part also analyzes some of the benefits and 
drawbacks of the proposed legislation. Part IV concludes by briefly explaining 
how specialized law may represent a broader shift for the bankruptcy system as 
a whole. 
I. ELIGIBILITY FOR STRUCTURED DEBT RELIEF  
Tribal entities are playing an increasingly significant role in U.S. commerce, 
yet these entities face uncertainty when it comes to addressing financial 
difficulties. It is at best unclear, and at worst outright prohibited, for tribal 
entities to use the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as debtors. This Part describes the 
current treatment of tribal entities under relevant U.S. laws and highlights some 
of the arguments for and against their eligibility for bankruptcy relief. 
Ultimately, this Part concludes that tribal entities should be eligible for 
structured debt relief in appropriate circumstances. 
A. The Status Quo: Confusion and Uncertainty 
Tribes and tribal businesses are increasingly involved in commerce—with 
the blessing and encouragement of the U.S. government.16 But what happens if 
 
 16 See Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or Socialism 
Succeed?, 80 OREGON L. REV. 757, 760–63 (2001) (contrasting federal control over economic activity and jobs 
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a tribal entity experiences financial distress? The answer is unclear for several 
reasons. The status of a tribal entity itself is often ambiguous. Is the entity 
sovereign? Can it be sued? How much does it resemble a non-tribal business 
entity? It does not seem possible for tribes themselves to file for bankruptcy, and 
there is no clear answer as to whether a tribal business could use the Bankruptcy 
Code. In particular, the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with other laws and policies 
pertaining to tribes and tribal businesses. These uncertainties cloud business 
relations with Indian nations and may have the effect of closing off access to 
lenders and other opportunities. 
1. Tribal Entities in Commerce  
To date, a handful of tribal-affiliated corporations have sought access to the 
U.S. bankruptcy system as debtors.17 Nevertheless, many more tribal entities 
experienced financial difficulties during the 2008 financial crisis18 and may have 
explored bankruptcy or other debt restructuring options without actually filing.19 
In addition, the threat of fiscal distress for tribal entities is significant due to 
these entities’ engagement in nearly all areas of commerce.  
The 2008 recession was difficult on nearly all businesses, and many tribal 
casinos become overleveraged during this time.20 At least six casinos sought to 
restructure their debt out of court between 2010 and 2013.21 These restructurings 
were largely consensual, as both sides had incentives to negotiate: creditors 
wanted the gaming operation to remain in business, produce revenue, and allow 
the tribal entity to service its debt, while tribes wanted their gaming assets to 
operate because these operations often funded basic public services for tribal 
 
in Indian country with the relatively hands-off policy the federal government takes with respect to non-Indian 
businesses). 
 17 Ji Hun Kim & Christopher S. Koenig, Rolling the Dice on Debtor Eligibility: Native American Tribes 
and the Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2015, at 18, 18–19. 
 18 For example, the La Posta Casino near San Diego shut down due to “lack of business and mounting 
debt” in 2012. J. Harry Jones, Santa Ysabel Casino Goes Out of Business, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE 
(Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sdut-santa-ysabel-casino-debt-2014feb03-
htmlstory.html; see Jonathan Martin, Elizabeth Warren, Addressing Claims of Native Ancestry, Vows to Press 
for Tribes, N.Y. TIMES: POLITICS, (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/us/politics/elizabeth-
warren-trump.html (noting that some tribes “account for the most impoverished communities in the country”). 
 19 John Froonjian, Indian Casinos Not Immune to Troubles During Recession, THE PRESS OF ATLANTIC 
CITY (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com/web_specials/indian-casinos-not-immune-to-troubles-
during-recession/article_ea6131b2-9a82-11de-8f64-001cc4c03286.html. 
 20 Adam Moses, Drowning in Debt? A Look at Recent Debt Restructurings in the Tribal Gaming Industry, 
GLOBAL GAMING BUSINESS, (2013), https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/2/12269/Drowning-in-Debt-
By-Adam-Moses-March-2013.pdf. 
 21 Id. (listing ongoing and recently completed restructurings). 
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members.22 Despite these incentives, when disagreements occurred, the lack of 
a neutral third party, such as a judge or arbitrator, to resolve these disagreements 
sometimes dragged out the process.23 Indeed, tribal restructurings from this 
period have been characterized as “rather protracted affairs, with some taking 
years to complete.”24 
Casinos are popular businesses for tribes, in part because Congress has 
supported the development of tribal gaming operations. In 1988, Congress 
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”),25 which establishes a 
jurisdictional framework governing Indian gaming.26 The Act was designed to 
encouraging tribal entities to engage in commerce.27 By 2001, so-called “gaming 
tribes” had made a significant impact on the U.S. economy, contributing $32 
billion in revenue, $12.4 billion in wages, and creating 490,000 jobs.28 “The 
benefits from Indian gaming also spill over to non-Indian communities and to 
federal and state tax revenues.”29 
Importantly, casinos represent just one component of tribal business. 
Significant incentives exist for enterprises that do business with Native 
American-owned companies, including access to cash rebates, discounted 
leasing rates, and tax-exempt financing.30 For their part, tribal businesses, and 
particularly tribally chartered corporations, also enjoy advantages, including 
avoidance of state regulation and taxation, as well as ease of formation.31 Tribes 
and tribal corporations regularly engage in real estate development,32 banking 
 
 22 Moses, supra note 20. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. (citing the restructuring of the Foxwoods Resort Casino). 
 25 Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.). 
 26 25 U.S.C. § 2702. 
 27 Id. (“The purpose of this chapter is to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian 
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”). 
 28 Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian Country, 12 ABA BUS. L. SECT. NO. 6 (July/August 
2003). 
 29 ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 71 
(Univ. Neb. Press 2013) (2012).  
 30 See generally Advantages of Doing Business With Native Americans, ABA SECTION OF STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Spring 2016 Meeting, available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/state_local_government/NavigatingTribalWatersRobSaunooke41116.authcheckdam.pdf 
(discussing these and other advantages conferred by federal and state law). 
 31 Choosing a Tribal Business Structure, U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR, Dec. 10, 2015, https://www.bia.gov/sites/ 
bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/ieed/bia/pdf/idc1-032915.pdf. 
 32 Terry Pristin, Commercial Real Estate; Arizona Indians Turn to Real Estate Development, N.Y. TIMES: 
BUSINESS DAY (Dec. 24, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/24/business/commercial-real-estate-arizona-
indians-turn-to-real-estate-development.html (describing “a $600 million commercial development on 209 acres 
owned by . . . Salt River Pima-Maricopa families”). 
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and finance,33 telecommunications,34 wholesale and retail trade,35 and tourism,36 
to name a few examples. Indian nations are even getting involved in recreational 
marijuana sales: in October of 2017, the Las Vegas Paiute Tribe opened a 
10,000-square foot retail store in downtown Las Vegas.37  
Notably, tribes are also involved in payday lending and until recently, were 
the subject of much attention and focus by the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (“CFPB”).38 In January of 2018, the CFPB dropped a lawsuit against a 
group of lenders associated with a tribe. The suit alleged that the lenders had 
deceived consumers and failed to “disclose the true cost of the loans.”39 In 
addition, tribal businesses, particularly in the Southwestern United States, are 
heavily involved in the provision of energy and water to surrounding regions, in 
addition to employing hundreds of individuals.40 Financial distress for a tribal 
 
 33 Jennifer H. Weddle, Nothing Nefarious: The Federal Legal and Historical Predicate for Tribal 
Sovereign Lending, 61 FED. LAW. 58, 59 (2014) (“Over the past decade, approximately two dozen tribes have 
established online consumer lending enterprises.”). 
 34 See National Tribal Telecom Ass’n, http://www.nationaltribaltelecom.org/ (describing the 
Association’s purpose as “to provide a forum for tribally owned companies and those who work in the 
telecommunications industry”). 
 35 Galanda, supra note 28. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Jay Jones, Native American Tribe Opens Huge Pot Store Near Fremont Street in Las Vegas, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES: TRAVEL (Oct. 31, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/travel/deals/la-tr-las-vegas-paiute-
tribe-pot-store-20171030-story.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2018) (noting that the store, an “economic driver,” 
employs roughly 35% of the tribe). Several tribes have recently opened marijuana-related businesses. See J. 
Harry Jones, Gaming Gone Bust, Tribe Turns to Marijuana Farming, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (May 2, 2017, 
6:50 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/communities/north-county/sd-no-ysabel-marijuana-201705 
02-story.html (discussing how the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel has turned to marijuana cultivation). Struggling 
marijuana-related businesses have also had difficulty using the Bankruptcy Code. See Steven J. Boyajian, Just 
Say No to Drugs? Creditors Not Getting a Fair Shake When Marijuana-Related Cases are Dismissed, 36 AM. 
BANKR. INST. J. 9 (2017) (discussing cases where marijuana-related businesses debtors cannot get relief). 
 38 Zeke Faux, CFPB Signals Shift by Dropping Payday Lender Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-18/trump-led-cfpb-signals-shift-by-dropping-payday-
lender-lawsuit (explaining that online payday lenders associated with tribes are “surprisingly big” businesses 
that arose because tribes can argue that regulations pertaining to payday loans do not apply to them since these 
regulations are promulgated by state law). 
 39 Id. (suggesting that the decision to drop the suit came due to the new direction the Trump administration 
took with respect to the CFPB).  
 40 James Rainey, Biggest Coal-Burning Power Plant in the West is Most Likely Shutting Down, NBC 
NEWS, (Apr. 11, 2018, 11:23 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/biggest-coal-burning-power-
plant-west-most-likely-shutting-down-n864981 (describing the Navajo Generating Station in Arizona as “a 
centerpiece of the [reservation’s] economy,” which provides “hundreds of jobs” and “helps light the Southwest 
and powers the pumps that send Colorado River water to Tucson and Phoenix”); Noah Silber-Coats & Susanna 
Eden, Arizona Water Banking, Recharge, and Recovery, THE ARROYO (2017), https://wrrc.arizona.edu/sites/ 
wrrc.arizona.edu/files/attachment/Arroyo-2017.pdf (describing “Gila River Water Storage [ . . .], a company that 
markets stored water credits primarily to developers”). 
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business could therefore have devastating consequences, possibly affecting the 
supply of critical resources to entire regions of the country. 
Participating in all of these activities brings risks as well as rewards. Tribes 
and their affiliate entities might face litigation connected to their activities,41 
such as the CFPB lawsuit, or they may incur unsustainable amounts of debt.42 
As tribal entities continue to engage in U.S. commerce and to interact with non-
tribal individuals and organizations, it will become increasingly important for 
bankruptcy law to provide guidance on how these entities should be treated when 
they are subject to financial distress. Although, as noted, some casinos have been 
able to restructure their debts out of court, an out-of-court workout may not be 
feasible if a tribal entity is faced with a significant legal judgment,43 persistent 
holdout creditors,44 or several creditors clamoring for the same assets.  
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, commonly called the “bible” of 
federal Indian law,45 has very little on the subject of tribal bankruptcy. As tribal 
businesses become increasingly entrenched in the broader commercial sphere, it 
is critical that these businesses—and those who interact with them—know what 
to expect in the event of a financial setback. Scholars have long recognized the 
importance of establishing functioning economies in Indian communities by 
developing tribal- and Indian-owned economic activities.46 A necessary, but 
understudied, component of this process is ensuring that a system is in place to 
restructure or dissolve these economies if and when they fail. 
 
 41 Federal Indian Law—Tribal Sovereign Immunity—Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 301 (2014) (“Subsequent economic development by some Indian tribes has resulted in an 
increasing number of legal disputes that have run up against tribal immunity.”); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (holding that a tribe is immune from suit for commercial activities on nontribal 
land as long as federal law has not expressly waived immunity, but noting in dicta that a state may use its own 
enforcement measures against individuals affiliated with the commercial activity). 
 42 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11 ¶ 25.01 (LexisNexis 2012) 
(noting that “many casino operators incurred unsustainable debt levels” in the 1990s and 2000s and discussing 
tribal ownership of casinos). Professor David Skeel lists “whether unsustainable debt is a potential problem” as 
a factor to consider for determining when bankruptcy relief should be available. David A. Skeel, Jr., When 
Should Bankruptcy Be An Option (For People, Places, or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217 (2014). 
 43 See, e.g., the ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa bankruptcy, discussed infra (Part I.A.3), which was filed due to a large 
arbitration award. 
 44 See, e.g., Omnibus Statement of Facts and Omnibus Declaration of David Chelette in Support Thereof, 
In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 at 4 (July 3, 2012) (describing debtor’s failed 
attempt to pursue an out-of-court restructuring and creditors’ persistence in pursuing debtor’s assets). 
 45 “Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law,” LEXISNEXIS STORE, https://store.lexisnexis.com/ 
products/cohens-handbook-of-federal-indian-law-skuusSku57318. 
 46 ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION “CAPITALISM”: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 3 
(Univ. Neb. Press 2013) (2012).  
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2. Tribes’ Uncertain Status 
The U.S. legal system is not always clear with respect to its treatment of 
tribal entities. If a tribe or tribal corporation is conducting business solely with 
other tribal entities or individuals, “Indian law,” a “body of tribal, state and 
federal law,” governs.47 Indian nations have the authority to govern themselves 
under the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”),48 and many tribes organized under 
the IRA have chosen to adopt commercial laws modeled after U.S. laws like the 
Uniform Commercial Code.49 Tribes also have the authority to regulate and 
adjudicate insolvency matters arising within the tribe.50 
Complications arise, however, when entities outside of the tribe enter the 
picture. Although Indian nations are commonly referred to as “sovereign,” tribal 
sovereignty is not absolute.51 Native American tribes are said to have sovereign 
immunity from all federal laws of general application—unless Congress makes 
an “unequivocal expression” to abrogate such immunity.52 In the bankruptcy 
context, sovereign immunity can prevent creditors from exercising certain 
remedies against tribes and can prevent Indian nations from being made subject 
to federal and state court jurisdiction.53 Although tribes have the power to 
 
 47 Galanda, supra note 28. 
 48 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2018)). 
 49 Galanda, supra note 28. 
 50 Blake F. Quackenbush, Cross-Border Insolvency & The Eligibility of Indian Tribes to Use Chapter 15 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 61 (2012). 
 51 See David D. Haddock & Robert J. Miller, Can a Sovereign Protect Investors from Itself? Tribal 
Institutions to Spur Reservation Investment, 8 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 173, 186 (2004) (“If being sovereign 
means to be superior in position to all others, or at least independent of and unlimited by any other, tribes are 
not in fact sovereign, nor have they recaptured any substantial sovereignty from the national government.”); see 
also Stephen J. Lubben, Sovereign Bankruptcy Hydraulics, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. OF AMER. L. (forthcoming), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2923407 (“[S]overeignty and sovereign immunity occur along a 
continuum.”); Corina Rocha Pandeli, Note, When the Chips are Down: Do Indian Tribes with Insolvent Gaming 
Operations have the Ability to File for Bankruptcy Under the Federal Bankruptcy Code?, 2 U.N.L.V. GAMING 
L.J. 255, 259 (2011) (describing tribes as enjoying a “relatively sovereign relationship with the federal 
government”). 
 52 Cartwright, supra note 10; Florida Paraplegic, Ass’n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 
166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that, although Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act can apply 
to public accommodations run by tribes, Congress did not unequivocally abrogate the tribe’s sovereign immunity 
to a cause of action under the Act). For a discussion of the tension between tribal sovereignty and Congress’s 
plenary power over tribes, see Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Pleanry Power of Congress over the 
Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’ Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413, 422 (1988). For an 
argument that this tension is problematic, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric 
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian 
Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 443 (1988) (“The effects . . . of a diminished, unequal status for any racial 
minority in United States law cannot begin to be attacked and erased until the contradictions in the legal status 
of that minority group are recognized and rejected.”) (emphasis in original). 
 53 Moses, supra note 20. 
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regulate their own “internal and social relations,” because another authority 
(Congress) can abrogate their immunity, they do not possess “the full attributes 
of sovereignty.”54 Thus, although tribes are free to “make their own laws and be 
ruled by them,” tribal sovereignty is more attenuated when Indian nations 
engage in commerce with non-tribal entities, and Congress may use its plenary 
power to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in certain circumstances.55 
As a general matter, many courts extend comity56 or full faith and credit57 to 
tribal court orders. Tribal sovereign immunity from suit also generally extends 
to tribal casinos, businesses, and some tribal-affiliated corporations.58 In general, 
tribes are only subject to suit in contract if the tribe and contract counterparty 
expressly negotiate a sovereign immunity waiver.59 In practice, these waivers 
are quite common, and some tribes have even agreed to waive immunity on a 
blanket basis for all tribal businesses incorporated under the IRA.60 But despite 
the use of sovereign immunity waivers in practice, Indian nations have 
successfully challenged these waivers in court and sometimes had them 
invalidated.61 Thus, a sovereign immunity waiver is not a guarantee that a 
creditor or contract counterparty will be able to subject a tribe to suit outside of 
tribal court. Furthermore, application of sovereign immunity to tribal businesses 
and commercial activities (rather than to the tribe itself) has been called into 
question in recent years.62 
When tribal entities engage in commerce, the implications of their sovereign 
status can be disputed, whether due to an explicit immunity waiver or the entity’s 
 
 54 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886) (holding that Congress possesses the power to 
extend federal criminal jurisdiction to Indians on reservations). 
 55 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
 56 See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997) (determining that principles of comity 
govern whether a court should recognize and enforce a tribal court judgment). 
 57 See, e.g., Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (holding that tribal laws are entitled 
to full faith and credit in New Mexico courts). 
 58 See Galanda, supra note 28; see also Bales v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D.N.M. 
2009) (holding that tribal corporation was entitled to sovereign immunity with respect to non-Native American 
employee’s claims of race and age discrimination). 
 59 Galanda, supra note 28. 
 60 Galanda, supra note 28; Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 194 (“[M]ost, if not all, Indian tribes have 
prospectively waived, and will prospectively waive, their immunity in specific contracts to facilitate business 
deals.”). 
 61 Moses, supra note 20. 
 62 Padraic I. McCoy, Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Commercial Activity: A Legal Summary and Policy 
Check, 57 FED. LAW. 41, 42 (2010); Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that expanding tribal immunity to a tribe’s off-reservation commercial activities is 
“unsupported by any rationale for [sovereign immunity] doctrine, inconsistent with the limits on tribal 
sovereignty, and an affront to state sovereignty”). 
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more attenuated sovereign status due to abrogation or the nature of the 
commercial engagement. The resulting uncertainty with respect to tribal status 
impacts tribes’ treatment under the Bankruptcy Code.63 
3. Eligibility for Bankruptcy 
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code governs debtor eligibility. There is no 
“uniform treatment or definitive classification of a tribe” in § 109 or, indeed, 
anywhere in the Code.64 According to § 109, only a “person” or a “municipality” 
may be a debtor under the Code.65 “Person” is defined broadly in the Code and 
includes individuals, partnerships, and corporations; however, a “governmental 
unit” is not a person.66 Instead, a “governmental unit” is defined in the Code as 
“United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; foreign state; 
department, agency or instrumentality of [each of the foregoing]; or other 
foreign or domestic government.”67 Although tribes are not explicitly listed in 
either definition, courts have determined that Native American tribes fall within 
the category of a “governmental unit.”68 For Code purposes, this suggests both 
that Congress may have abrogated tribal immunity with respect to the Code69 
and that Indian nations cannot access the Code for bankruptcy protection.70 
 
 63 See Lubben, supra note 51 (“[P]ushing against sovereignty increases the need for a governmental entity 
to have access to sovereign bankruptcy.”). 
 64 R. Spencer Clift III, The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent Dramatic 
Commercial Advancement; and a Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy Code and 
Related Matters, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 211 (2002) (claiming a lack of clarity in the Code with respect to 
tribes and arguing that “Congress must clearly and plainly authorize the use of tribal property or enact legislation 
that insures, guarantees, and safeguards tribes from financial stress”).  
 65 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 66 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). 
 67 11 U.S.C. § 101(27). 
 68 See, e.g., Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he category 
‘Indian Tribes’ is simply a specific member of the group of domestic governments.”); In re Platinum Oil Props. 
LLC, 465 B.R. 621, 643 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2011) (“The language ‘or other foreign or domestic government found 
in [§ 101(27)] includes Indian tribes.”); Russell v. Fort McDowell Yavapai Nation (In re Russell), 293 B.R. 34, 
44 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2003) (“[O]ther foreign or domestic governments in § 101(27) unequivocally, and without 
implication, includes Indian tribes as ‘governmental units.’”). 
 69 In 1994, Congress amended § 106 to demonstrate its intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of 
governmental units. Although the impact on tribal immunity is disputed, there is at least an implication that the 
sovereign immunity of tribes classified as “governmental units” is abrogated. See, Clift, supra note 10; 1-7 
Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, §7.05 (LexisNexis 2017) (noting division in the courts as to whether 
the Code waives tribal immunity); American Indian Law Deskbook §7:2 (May 2017) (noting that, while the 
Ninth Circuit has held that Congress has expressly abrogated sovereign immunity in this context, other courts 
disagree); Cartwright, supra note 10 (noting that “an overwhelming majority of courts have held that tribes are 
governmental units” under the Bankruptcy Code). 
 70 Cartwright, supra note 10. 
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To understand why tribes do not qualify as debtors eligible under the 
Bankruptcy Code, it is useful to know each of the possible chapters available for 
prospective debtors.71 Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 15 of the Code each outline 
a different process for prospective debtors to take. Chapter 7 of the Code governs 
the process of liquidation,72 while chapters 1173 and 1374 address reorganization 
and individual debt adjustment, respectively. Chapter 9 of the Code provides for 
the adjustment of municipal debt,75 while chapter 12 deals with family farmers 
and family fishermen.76 Finally, chapter 15 of the Code provides a way for 
foreign representatives in bankruptcy proceedings outside of the United States 
to access U.S. courts.77 
As “governmental units,” tribes do not qualify to file for bankruptcy under 
either chapters 7 or 11 of the Code, because both of these chapters require a 
debtor to be a “person.”78 Furthermore, only individuals (i.e. individual human 
beings) may use chapter 13 to reorganize their debts.79 Although chapter 9 of the 
Code addresses the adjustment of debts of municipal governments, a tribe does 
not qualify under this chapter either because chapter 9 debtors must be 
“municipalities,” which must be governed by a U.S. State.80 Indian nations are 
not subject to or instrumentalities of U.S. States and so would not qualify as a 
“municipality” under the Code either.81 Tribes also are unlikely to meet the very 
 
 71 For an in-depth discussion as to why tribes themselves are ineligible for bankruptcy relief under the 
Code, see Pandeli, supra note 51, at 269–73. 
 72 “Chapter 7 – Liquidation,” 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. 
 73 “Chapter 11 – Reorganization,” 11 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. 
 74 “Chapter 13 – Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income,” 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. 
 75 “Chapter 9 – Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality,” 11 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. 
 76 “Chapter 12 – Adjustment of Debts of a Family Farmer or Fisherman with Regular Annual Income,” 
11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. 
 77 “Chapter 15 – Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,” 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. 
 78 11 U.S.C. § 109(b), (d). Section 109(d) contains other categories of debtors eligible to file for chapter 
11, but none of them would encompass tribes. 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (referencing a “railroad,” “an uninsured State 
member bank, or a corporation organized under Section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act . . . .” as eligible for 
chapter 11). 
 79 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (“Only an individual with regular income . . . may be a debtor under chapter 13 of 
this title.”). 
 80 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (“The term ‘municipality’ means political subdivision or public agency or 
instrumentality of a State.”). 
 81 Even if chapter 9 were modified so that a tribal debtor could be considered a qualifying “municipality,” 
chapter 9 may be inapt for other reasons. For example, chapter 9 is not designed to deal with complex debt 
structures, which tribal debtors, thanks to their intertwined relationships with tribes, may have. Vincent S.J. 
Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. at 40 (forthcoming 2019) 
(noting that chapter 9 was designed to address the debt of special purpose municipalities with “simple capital 
structures”). The overall purpose of a tribal debt restructuring is more akin to that of a chapter 11 case than a 
chapter 9 case; in particular, liquidation is not an option for chapter 9 debtors. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 
242 B.R. 18, 41 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999) (“[T]he legislative purpose underlying [chapter 9] . . . is to allow an 
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specific definitions of “family farmer” or “family fisherman” to qualify for debt 
adjustment under chapter 12.82 Finally, although some have proposed to allow 
tribes access to bankruptcy court via chapter 15, Indian nations are markedly 
different from the foreign representatives contemplated by chapter 1583 and, for 
reasons explained below, likely would not be able to successfully use chapter 15 
of the Bankruptcy Code either. 
Tribal corporations and other business entities owned by tribes are arguably 
distinct from the tribe itself.84 Thus, if a tribal corporation met the Code’s 
definition of a “person,” it could be eligible to file under chapters 7 or 11.85 
However, the sparse case law, discussed below, suggests that tribal corporations 
and other tribal business entities may be barred from bankruptcy relief under the 
Code if they are too closely affiliated with the tribe itself.86  
 
insolvent municipality to restructure its debts in order to continue to provide public services.”) (emphasis added); 
Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that chapter 11 serves the “purposes of promoting reorganization and of maximizing 
returns to creditors”). Chapter 9 also presupposes a relationship between the municipality and the state in which 
the municipality is located, a feature that is not present in the tribal business context. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(c)(2) (requiring state authorization to enter bankruptcy); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018(c) (“Representatives of 
the state in which the debtor is located may intervene in a chapter 9 case.”). Finally, the amount of control a 
municipality loses in a chapter 9 may by itself make a modified chapter 9 an unpalatable option, for reasons 
discussed infra. 
 82 11 U.S.C. § 101(18), (19), (19A), (19B), (20) (defining the terms “family farmer,” “family farmer with 
regular annual income,” “family fisherman,” “family fisherman with regular annual income,” and “farmer,” 
respectively). 
 83 11 U.S.C. § 101(24) (“The term ‘foreign representative means a person or body, including a person or 
body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.”). 
 84 Kim & Koenig, supra note 17. 
 85 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (defining “corporation” as an “association having a power of privilege that a 
private corporation, but not an individual or a partnership possesses” and as an “unincorporated company or 
association”). 
 86 These entities include corporations organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, which 
provides that the Secretary of the Interior may issue a charter of incorporation to tribes. Indian Reorganization 
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 (2018)). The Department of the Interior 
has determined that Section 17 only allows such charters to be issued to tribes (as opposed to tribal members). 
For a critical discussion of this issue, see Post of Gabriel Galanda, Amend IRA Section 17 to Allow Federal 
Incorporation For Tribal Members, GALANDA BROADMAN, (Jan. 8, 2012), http://galandabroadman.com/blog/ 
2012/01/amend-ira-section-17-to-allow-federal-incorporation-for-tribal-members (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
In the context of whether tribal corporations can have sovereign immunity, several courts have articulated 
various tests to determine whether the tribally-created entity is an “arm of the tribe” and thus enjoys sovereign 
immunity. See, e.g., Matter of Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund, 86 N.Y.2d 553 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1995) (multi-factor test); People ex rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enterprises, 386 P.3d 357 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
2016) (five-factor test). For further discussion of the development of tribal corporations formed under the Indian 
Reorganization Act and their sometimes complex relationship with tribal governments, see Miller, supra note 
46, at 44–46. 
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To date, two tribal-affiliated entities (aside from the Alaska Native 
Corporations discussed below)87 have sought to be debtors in U.S. bankruptcy 
proceedings. In the first case, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, a casino 
owned and operated by the Iipay Nation filed for bankruptcy88 after “struggling 
financially for years” with “debts of more than $50 million.”89 In its initial filings 
with the bankruptcy court, the debtor casino argued that it was a separate legal 
entity from the Iipay tribe and thus eligible to file for chapter 11 as an 
“unincorporated company.”90 Three parties in interest, including another Native 
American tribe (incidentally, also the debtor’s largest creditor) and the United 
States Trustee, filed motions to dismiss the case, arguing that the debtor was 
ineligible because the casino was merely an arm of the tribe itself.91 The parties 
moving for dismissal contended that there was no legal distinction between the 
tribe and the entity that ran the casino.92 As evidence, the objecting parties 
pointed to the loan documents, which provided that the tribe was the obligor that 
owned and operated the casino and which did not distinguish between the tribe 
and the casino entity.93 The bankruptcy court granted the parties’ motions to 
dismiss by summary order and did not write an opinion.94 Without access to 
bankruptcy relief, the casino was unable to negotiate with its creditors, including 
the County of San Diego, which the tribal chairman characterized as “unwilling 
 
 87 As discussed in Part I.C, infra, Alaska Native Corporations have also filed under the Bankruptcy Code. 
As Part I.C explains, these corporations are distinct from other tribal corporations. For this reason, they are 
discussed separately. 
 88 In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2012). 
 89 J. Harry Jones, Santa Ysabel Casino Goes Out of Business, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Feb. 3, 
2014), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/sdut-santa-ysabel-casino-debt-2014feb03-htmlstory. 
html. 
 90 Omnibus Statement of Facts and Omnibus Declaration of David Chelette in Support Thereof, In re 
Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2012), available at 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/omnibus-statement-of-facts-and-events.pdf (“The Debtor is an 
unincorporated company.”). 
 91 County of San Diego’s Motion to Dismiss Debtor’s Bankruptcy Case; Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support Thereof, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 
7, 2012), available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/san-diego-county-motion-to-dismiss.pdf; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss Bankruptcy Case for Lack of Eligibility 
and Authority, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012), 
available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/yavapai-apache-motion-to-dismiss.pdf; Acting 
United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Case, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-
PB11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2012), available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/us-motion-to-
dismiss.pdf. 
 92 See, e.g., Acting United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss Case, supra note 91, at 1 (“The Debtor’s 
structure, purpose, and authorization to conduct business activities by a tribal ordinance make it clear that it is 
an inclusive part of the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel and is not a separate legal entity.”). 
 93 See, e.g., id. at 8. 
 94 Minute Order, In re Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, Case No. 12-09415-PB11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 
2012), available at https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/dct-minute-order.pdf. 
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to renegotiate its financial agreement with the tribe in the face of economic 
hardship.”95 Faced with mounting debt, holdout creditors, and no access to 
bankruptcy court, the casino shut its doors in early 2014, and 115 employees lost 
their jobs.96 
In the second proceeding, a tribally chartered corporation wholly owned by 
a tribe filed for bankruptcy relief in Arizona. The debtor, ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa Inc., 
owned and operated the Skywalk at the Grand Canyon and filed for bankruptcy 
after a $28 million arbitration award was entered against it after a dispute over a 
development agreement.97 In its initial filings with the court, the debtor claimed 
to be “a tribal corporation that is separate from the [Hualapai] Nation and from 
other corporations or instrumentalities of the Nation.”98 Perhaps seeking to 
distinguish its situation from that of the Santa Ysabel Resort and Casino, the 
tribal corporation presented evidence that it had its own board of directors and 
that the corporation, rather than the tribe, was the party to the development 
agreement in dispute.99 The debtor also argued that the arbitration award was 
enforceable only against the corporation and was not collectible from the 
tribe.100  
No one challenged the debtor’s eligibility for bankruptcy in the ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa 
case.101 Ultimately, however, “the debtor and developer settled their dispute and 
consensually dismissed the case.”102 Thus, the ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa case does not 
provide much clarity with respect to how a tribal corporation might proceed in 
bankruptcy. 
The dearth of legal precedent, combined with ambiguities in applying the 
Bankruptcy Code to tribal entities, make it impossible to be certain whether a 
tribal entity will be eligible for bankruptcy relief. The cases to date shed little 
light on the issue due to the lack of published legal opinions. Although the 
 
 95 Jones, supra note 89, at 1. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Christine L. Swanick et al., Tribal Court Bankruptcy Petition Raises Issues of First Impression for 
Bankruptcy Court, SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP (Mar. 7, 2013), available at https://www. 
lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5097886-3631-438b-b774-d4a992fc65b4. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Kim & Koenig, supra note 10, at 19 (“While several contemporaneous articles questioned whether the 
debtor was an eligible filer, no parties-in-interest challenged the debtor’s eligibility . . . .”). 
 102 Id.; see ‘Sa’ Nyu Wa, Inc. Bankruptcy New Filing Alert: Motion for Order Dismissing the Bankruptcy 
Case and/or Converting the Case to Chapter 7, CHAPTER 11 CASES (May 21, 2014), available at 
http://chapter11cases.com/2014/05/21/sa-nyu-wa-inc-bankruptcy-new-filing-alert-motion-for-order-
dismissing-the-bankruptcy-case-andor-converting-the-case-to-chapter-7/. 
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question of a tribal corporation’s eligibility for bankruptcy may be fact-
dependent, the state of the law is unclear as to whether and under what 
circumstances tribal entities will be eligible to be debtors in bankruptcy. Tribal 
corporations may thus find themselves in a catch-22: they may experience the 
same debt problems as an ordinary business established under state law, but they 
may be deemed too closely affiliated with an Indian nation to qualify for 
bankruptcy protection. 
Even if a tribe—or, more likely, a tribal business—were deemed eligible to 
file for bankruptcy, however, tribal entities are likely to encounter distinct 
difficulties when proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. As explained in more 
detail below, fundamental inconsistencies in law and policy relating to tribal 
entities make relief improbable, if not outright impossible, for tribal debtors to 
attain, even if eligibility-related problems could be overcome. 
B. Obstacles to Tribal Bankruptcy 
Given tribal entities’ significant role in U.S. commerce and the uncertainties 
present in U.S. bankruptcy law with respect to tribal debtors, it makes sense to 
provide a clear path allowing tribal entities to access structured debt relief. 
Nevertheless, tribal entities and others may find such access objectionable on 
several grounds. In particular, applying laws created without tribal input, such 
as the Bankruptcy Code, may be seen as the imposition of Western norms and 
legal traditions onto tribes. Some Indian law scholars have criticized this 
imposition in other contexts, arguing that it is tantamount to colonization and “a 
diminution of tribes’ inherent right to govern themselves.”103 They point out that 
the United States’ own theory of Indian sovereignty supports the perpetuation of 
Indian nations’ autonomous existence, even if tribal decisions conflict with 
Western ideals.104 Thus, if the Bankruptcy Code were adapted such that it clearly 
applied to tribal debtors, its application may still be considered an undesirable 
infringement on tribal autonomy. 
In some respects, all debtors trade the loss of some autonomy in exchange 
for bankruptcy’s benefits. By consenting to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court (and, in some cases, to a trustee’s handling of their assets), debtors in 
bankruptcy necessarily give up some of their abilities to manage their own 
affairs and make their own decisions in exchange for the benefit of a discharge 
of debt. Yet, sovereign debtors arguably pay a higher price for a fresh start than 
 
 103 Trevor Reed, Who Owns Our Ancestors’ Voices? Tribal Claims to Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 40 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 275, 300 (2016). 
 104 Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 800 (2007). 
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non-sovereign debtors by giving up their full sovereign rights to enter 
bankruptcy. Perhaps recognizing this significant sacrifice, Congress has not 
made bankruptcy a remedy for U.S. states.105 Even if Congress has abrogated 
tribal sovereign immunity for bankruptcy purposes, a bankruptcy judge’s (or 
trustee’s, or creditor’s) ability to divest tribes of property or dictate how that 
property is to be used represents a significant loss of independence that tribes 
and tribal scholars may not consider to be a fair trade-off, particularly given the 
current Bankruptcy Code’s limited usefulness to tribal entities, explained further 
below.  
A related concern about allowing tribal entities access to structured debt 
relief comes from possible incompatibilities between tribal and Western notions 
of property.106 Bankruptcy law is based, in part, on the notion that non-
bankruptcy law governing property rights should generally be respected in the 
bankruptcy system.107 But if a tribal debtor were to file for bankruptcy, and if its 
creditors were non-tribal entities, would tribal law or state property law apply in 
the bankruptcy case?108 And if tribal law concerning property applied, how 
would a bankruptcy court, which likely lacks expertise in tribal property law, 
interpret it? In other contexts, scholars have noted that federal courts may feel 
uncomfortable enforcing property interests arising under tribal law, particularly 
when the type of property at issue lies outside of those courts’ general 
expertise.109 Uncertainties surrounding application of property law principles 
 
 105 Jennifer Burnett, 3 Questions on State Bankruptcy, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 
http://www.csg.org/pubs/capitolideas/enews/issue65_3.aspx (quoting Prof. Kenneth Katkin: “The federal 
bankruptcy code does not allow—and has never allowed—state governments to declare bankruptcy”). Some 
scholars, however, believe bankruptcy should be made available to the states. See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., States 
of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012) (arguing for state bankruptcy). 
 106 See Reed, supra note 103, at 285 (noting that the Supreme Court has expressed beliefs that indigenous 
property rules are “based on incomprehensible customs”); Miller, supra note 16, at 764–75 (describing Indian 
conceptions of private property and noting conflicting views on private ownership of land, as well as a 
demonstrated understanding of private property principles on the part of native peoples); but see ROBERT J. 
MILLER, RESERVATION CAPITALISM: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 11–12 (Univ. Neb. Press 
2012) (summarizing Indian private property rights and noting that “the only major difference between 
Indigenous principles of property and Euro-American concepts was in how those societies viewed the private 
ownership of land”). 
 107 See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (holding that a property issue arising in 
bankruptcy should be resolved by reference to state law). 
 108 Existing cases may provide some guidance on this issue. See American Indian Law Deskbook § 5:19 
(May 2017) (collecting cases and noting that “a state’s interests will justify regulation of a tribe or its members 
only ‘in exceptional circumstances’”); In re DeCora, 396 B.R. 222, 225 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (finding that tribal 
law was determinative of lien-holder priority in a bankruptcy proceeding because the tribe’s “interest in 
controlling the distribution of its revenue far outweighs [the State’s] interest in enforcing its commercial code”). 
 109 See Reed, supra note 103, at 306 (“It is clear that Congress and the courts believe indigenous groups 
are entitled to control their lands, culture, and membership by means of sovereign governments operating under 
distinct ontological frameworks, but they are also uncomfortable with enforcing indigenous entitlements that 
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may make it difficult for contract counterparties and lenders to price the risk of 
lending to tribal entities on a secured basis. 
Other key differences between the Bankruptcy Code and federal laws 
governing Indian nations suggest that Congress was not contemplating 
bankruptcy as a possibility for tribal debtors when it created the Bankruptcy 
Code. In particular, if a tribal gaming operation, such as a casino, were to file 
for bankruptcy, conflicts between the Code and the IGRA would need to be 
resolved. For example, the IGRA requires a tribe to hold the sole proprietary 
interest in any gaming operation.110 The IGRA would thus be violated if a tribal 
gaming operation filed for bankruptcy and a trustee began operating the debtor’s 
business pursuant to § 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.111 But even if the debtor 
remained in control of the business, as is common in a chapter 11 bankruptcy 
case, the Code-prescribed duty of the debtor-in-possession to preserve estate 
assets for the benefit of creditors would conflict with the IGRA’s limitations on 
creditors’ ability to force a change in management or to assume control of a 
tribal gaming facility.112  
Perhaps most critically, bankruptcy law’s absolute priority rule conflicts 
with the IGRA’s requirement that only the tribe itself can control and possess an 
Indian gaming operation.113 The IGRA would thus mandate that equity interests 
remain in the organization even if the debtor’s more senior creditors were not 
fully repaid.114 This presents a direct conflict with the absolute priority rule, 
which stipulates, effectively, that creditors must be paid in full before equity can 
receive anything in a bankruptcy.115 The absolute priority rule is at the heart of 
the chapter 11 distributional system, and the Supreme Court recently reinforced 
the importance of complying with the rule in the context of a plan or structured 
 
arise from these ontological formations that cannot be justified through the logics of American jurisprudence.”).  
 110 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988) [hereinafter IGRA]. 
 111 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (“[T]he trustee may operate the debtor’s business.”). 
 112 IGRA at § 2710; see Steven T. Waterman, Tribal Troubles – Without Bankruptcy Relief, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Jan. 2010, at 33. Similar problems arise in the non-profit sector. See, e.g., Bruckner, supra note 11, at 
727 (“Nonprofit colleges’ lack of shareholders and the nondistribution constraint prevent a bankruptcy filing 
from shifting control of that enterprise from its current management.”). 
 113 IGRA, supra note 110. 
 114 See Stephan A. Hoover, Comment, Forcing the Tribe to Bet on the House the Limited Options and 
Risks to the Tribe when Indian Gaming Operations Seek Bankruptcy Relief, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 269, 297 (2013); 
see also Steven T. Waterman, Tribal Troubles—Without Bankruptcy Relief, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 2010, at 
44 (noting that IGRA’s sole proprietary-interest requirement would prohibit a restructuring that converts debt 
into equity and that § 1129’s subjugation provisions could not be satisfied without a 100% repayment plan if the 
tribe retains the “sole proprietary interest,” as IGRA requires). 
 115 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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dismissal of a case.116 Thus, the IGRA’s conflict with the absolute priority rule 
is significant. Even if deemed eligible to file for chapter 11, if a tribal debtor 
cannot propose a plan that conforms with absolute priority—and compliance 
with the IGRA likely means it cannot—it will be unable to use the bankruptcy 
system to restructure its debts.117 
In sum, the IGRA’s limitations on management of a tribal gaming operation 
conflict with specific Bankruptcy Code provisions.118 Because confirmation of 
a chapter 11 plan of reorganization requires compliance with all regulatory 
provisions, including the IGRA,119 it would be nearly impossible for a tribal 
gaming operation to successfully restructure its debts under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  
There are several other obstacles for tribal debtors seeking to use the U.S. 
bankruptcy system. For example, the National Indian Gaming Commission 
(“NIGC”) must approve all “management contracts” for tribal gaming 
operations, including agreements like trust indentures,120 and some courts have 
interpreted this mandate as giving the NIGC broad discretion in construing these 
agreements as management contracts.121 Tribes themselves are also different 
from other entities that restructure their debts under the Bankruptcy Code. These 
differences arise from tribes’ structure, governmental interrelationship, and 
dependence on the federal government.122 Certain federal laws, regulations, and 
 
 116 Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S. Ct. 1242 (2016). 
 117 In certain instances, as in the case of some bankruptcies of nonprofit debtors, courts have held that the 
absolute priority rule does not apply. This is typically because these courts have determined that the nonprofit’s 
members do not hold equity interests in the nonprofit and that they do not derive an economic benefit based on 
their membership interests. See Kavita Gupta, Representing a Nonprofit Debtor in Bankruptcy, 31 CAL. BANKR. 
J. 843, 855–57 (2012) (collecting cases); Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable 
Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit Entities, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31, 39 (2012) 
(“[C]ourts overall . . . hold that the absolute priority rule is inapplicable to nonprofits.”). In the case of a tribal 
corporation bankruptcy, it is unlikely that this exception would apply to excuse compliance with the absolute 
priority rule, because unlike members of a nonprofit, tribes do derive economic benefit based on their interests 
in the corporation. Indeed, this was the very purpose of IGRA. See Part I.A.1 supra. 
 118 Hoover, supra note 10, at 296–98 (noting that appointment of a trustee under § 1104 of the Code would 
be prohibited under the IGRA). 
 119 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (noting that the plan must not be “forbidden by law”). 
 120 Blaine I. Green, Craig A. Barbarosh, & Daron T. Carreiro, Seventh Circuit Rejects Bond Indenture and 
Its Waive of Tribal Sovereign Immunity, But Allows Leave to Amend for Equitable Claims, PILLSBURY (Oct. 31, 
2011), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/seventh-circuit-rejects-bond-indenture-and-its-
waiver-of-tribal.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 121 Hoover, supra note 10, at 276; Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp., 658 
F.3d 684, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that indenture was an unapproved management contract for the 
Indian gaming facility and was therefore void as a violation of the IGRA). 
 122 Waterman, supra note 112, at 87. 
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treaties apply uniquely to tribal entities;123 consequently, some scholars have 
analogized tribal corporations to certain regulated industries, such as public 
utilities, rather than run-of-the-mill corporations.124 This unique regulatory 
backdrop has led some scholars to conclude that bankruptcy is unworkable for 
Indian nations and their businesses.125  
A tribe’s relationship with the federal government further complicates 
matters.126 The federal government holds about eleven million acres of real 
property in trust for tribes,127 meaning that tribes must obtain express approval 
from the government in order to sell, convey, or otherwise encumber the trust 
property.128 This property is also shielded from alienation under state laws.129 
This trust arrangement, with its corresponding restraint on alienation, was 
designed to protect and even benefit Indian nations by guaranteeing tribal 
possession of land and protecting tribal land from sale by state authorities for 
infractions like nonpayment of taxes.130 When an entity is financially distressed, 
however, restraints on alienation like the ones that apply to tribes may negatively 
impact an entity’s ability to access financing.131 Prospective creditors are 
naturally hesitant to lend to entities in financial distress. To entice a creditor to 
loan money, a distressed entity may therefore seek to offer creditors a lien on 
unencumbered property as security for that loan. Such scenarios are common in 
 
 123 See Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/ 
frequently-asked-questions (explaining the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the work that it does with tribal 
governments). 
 124 Waterman, supra note 112, at 87. 
 125 Id. (suggesting non-bankruptcy alternatives, such as a bailout, for financially struggling tribal 
businesses). 
 126 See Miller, supra note 46, at 38 (“[T]he federal government is heavily involved in most business 
dealings in Indian Country.”). 
 127 Miller, supra note 46, at 37. 
 128 Purchases or grants of lands from Indians, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (“No purchase, grant, lease, or other 
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any 
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the 
Constitution.”); Leases of restricted lands, 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2012) (providing that leasing of trust lands must be 
approved by the Secretary of the Interior); FRED ANDREW SEATON & ELMER F. BENNETT, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
685 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1958); see Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 221 (“That so many of their 
assets remain under governmental trust under outdated policy rationales creates great difficulty for indigenous 
peoples.”); Miller, supra note 46, at 36 (“‘Trust lands’ are lands that tribal governments or individual Indians 
own as the beneficial owner but the United States owns the legal title and is the legal owner.”). 
 129 Cf. id. See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 16.03(4)(d)(iii) (describing how involuntary 
transfers of allotments, including those that may occur in bankruptcy, are impermissible and noting that “if an 
allotee becomes a bankrupt, title to the allotment does not pass to the bankruptcy trustee”). 
 130 SEATON & BENNETT, supra note 128, at 685. 
 131 See Miller, supra note 46, at 44 (“The fact that the United States retains the trusteeship and legal 
ownership of these lands makes them almost totally unavailable for borrowing money and for developing 
economic activities.”). 
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bankruptcy, particularly in the early stages of a case, in order to provide the 
debtor with adequate funding to proceed with the bankruptcy case.132 Because 
tribes may not encumber trust property without the federal government’s 
consent, a tribal debtor’s ability to obtain financing quickly by offering up 
unencumbered property may be severely limited if the tribe owns few to no non-
trust assets.133 
Tribes and tribal corporations thus face severe roadblocks if they seek to use 
the Bankruptcy Code. Even if a tribal debtor were deemed eligible to file for 
bankruptcy, the Code’s incompatibility with tribal norms, federal laws, and 
policies such as the trust relationship make use of the Code unappealing at best 
and downright impossible at worst. 
C. Incompatibility Illustrated: Alaska Native Corporations 
There is perhaps no better illustration of the incompatibility of bankruptcy 
and tribal law than the cases of Alaska Native Corporations. Alaska Native 
Corporations are regional and village corporations established by the Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”).134 Signed into law in 1971, ANCSA 
was, at the time, the largest land claims settlement in U.S. history.135 In return 
for the abrogation of Native claims to certain aboriginal land, Alaska Natives136 
received land and money from the federal government, which were divided 
among the various tribal corporations established under the law.137 
The Act and its amendments created 13 regional economic development 
corporations.138 Alaska Natives hold stock in these corporations, enabling them 
to earn income, remain in their traditional villages, and preserve their culture.139 
The Act enjoyed significant support from Natives and non-Natives alike and was 
 
 132 See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (contemplating mechanisms that a debtor may use to obtain credit). 
 133 Moses, supra note 20 (“[T]here are important limitations on what collateral tribes can grant their 
lenders without obtaining federal approval, including, for example, limitations on the ability of a tribe to 
encumber its land.”). 
 134 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–24 (1971). 
 135 Monica E. Thomas, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Conflict and Controversy, POLAR 
RECORD, 1986, http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/articles/mthomas/ancsa_conflict.htm#Historical 
perspective. 
 136 “Native” is defined in the ANCSA as, inter alia, “a citizen of the United States who is a person of one-
fourth degree or more Alaska Indian . . . Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination thereof.” 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b). 
 137 E. Budd Simpson, Doing Business with Alaska Native Corporations: A New Model for Native American 
Business Entities, ABA BUS. L. SECT., July/Aug. 2007 https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2007-07-08/ 
simpson.shtml. 
 138 Thomas, supra note 135. 
 139 Id. 
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created with substantial involvement from Alaska Natives.140 Because they were 
created for specific purposes under a federal statute, Alaska Native Corporations 
are considered “unique,” even in the world of federal Indian law, and represent 
a type of entity that is different from most other tribal and non-tribal 
corporations.141 
Since their creation, a few regional and village corporations have filed for 
bankruptcy.142 During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, “conflicts 
between the legislative purposes inherent in ANCSA and in the Bankruptcy 
Code have come to light,” leading scholars to argue that “the two statutes do not 
mesh well.”143 Notably, the Alaska Native Corporations, created by a political 
process, were fundamentally different from the voluntary corporations that 
characterize much of U.S. commerce.144 In addition, the ANCSA, like the IGRA, 
directly inverted the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, dictating that 
Native shareholders receive priority over their creditors.145 Scholars studying the 
Bankruptcy Code and the ANCSA noted additional conflicts between the two 
statutes relating to taxation; obligations with respect to land; income; and 
conflicts with the Code’s liquidation and plan confirmation provisions.146 In 
short, “[r]esolving the conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and ANCSA is 
not easy, as neither statute was drafted with a view to harmonizing with the 
other.”147 Although the Native Corporations that filed for bankruptcy were able 
to use the bankruptcy system, they found the Bankruptcy Code an inappropriate 
framework,148 leading scholars to conclude that the only way to reconcile the 
Code with the ANCSA was to “relax” interpretations of both statutes.149 
 
 140 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, ALASKA HUMANITIES FORUM, http://www.akhistorycourse.org/ 
modern-alaska/alaska-native-claims-settlement-act (last visited Feb. 6, 2018). 
 141 Simpson, supra note 137 (emphasizing these entities’ uniqueness and highlighting some of the 
distinctive opportunities they represent); DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND 
AMERICAN LAWS 198 (3rd ed., Univ. of Alaska Press 2012) (1978) (describing the ANCSA as an “evolving” 
experiment). 
 142 Kathryn A. Black, David H. Bundy, Cynthia Pickering Christianson, & Cabot Christianson, When 
Worlds Colide: Alaska Native Corporations and the Bankruptcy Code, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 73 (1989), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1251&context=alr. 
 143 Id. at 75. 
 144 Id. at 86; see also id. at 91 (“Many of the Bankruptcy Code’s most fundamental underlying assumptions 
about corporations . . . do not apply to Native corporations at all.”). 
 145 Id. at 90. 
 146 Id. at 101. 
 147 Id. at 130. 
 148 See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 141, at xii (suggesting that the 1991 amendments to ANCSA and the 
sale of Native net operating losses, rather than the bankruptcy process itself, “rescued several Native corporations 
from bankruptcy”). 
 149 Black, supra note 142, at 131. 
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* * * 
The Bankruptcy Code appears ill-equipped to handle tribal debtors of all 
sorts. Although tribal entities regularly transact in the U.S. commercial sphere, 
it is not clear that these entities, when faced with financial difficulty, will be able 
to play by the normal rules of the Bankruptcy Code without requiring 
adjustments to both bankruptcy and tribal law. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is 
fundamentally incompatible in many ways with the laws and policies pertaining 
to tribal entities. 
D. The Case for Tribal Debt Relief 
If a tribal debtor cannot effectively use the Bankruptcy Code, should it be 
cut off from the structured debt relief the Code provides? There are several 
reasons why structured debt relief may be valuable to tribal debtors. One reason 
relates to these entities’ asymmetrical treatment in the bankruptcy system. 
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding tribal entities’ eligibility to be debtors in 
bankruptcy, tribal entities can be and have been forced to use the system when 
they are creditors of a debtor in bankruptcy.150 The law is clear that parties 
adverse to tribes may bring the tribe (or a tribal business) into existing 
bankruptcy proceedings as either a party in interest or a creditor.151 This means 
that “[c]ourts can force tribes to participate in a system from which they cannot 
simultaneously derive a benefit.”152 
Of course, Indian nations are not the only entities that can be brought into 
court as creditors without being able to use the system as debtors. Banks and 
other financial institutions are treated in the same manner,153 and the federal 
government, the largest creditor in the country,154 cannot file for bankruptcy. 
But providing tribal entities with access to debt relief could bestow distinct 
 
 150 Cartwright, supra note 10, at 104 (“In a clear majority of courts, Native American sovereign immunity 
is abrogated, and tribal casinos are subject to numerous federal statutes, including the Bankruptcy Code when 
they are creditors.”); Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 2.03 (finding that “several cases have concluded, 
often without discussion, that the Code applies to the commercial activities of tribes as creditors”); In re White, 
139 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that tribe’s participation as a creditor in bankruptcy waived immunity 
from adjudication of its claim in bankruptcy proceedings). 
 151 See, e.g., Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that because 
Congress abrogated Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Code, debtor’s adversary 
proceeding against the Navajo Nation could proceed in bankruptcy court). 
 152 Hogan, supra note 10. 
 153 See generally Hynes & Walt, supra note 13. 
 154 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. R. Scott Appling, No. 
16-1215 at 21 (“The United States is the largest creditor in the Nation and frequently appears as a creditor in 
bankruptcy cases.”). 
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commercial benefits. For example, some research has shown that access to debt 
relief provides more certainty at the lending stage and may even open up new 
lending options.155 In contrast, the economic uncertainty that characterizes a lack 
of access to bankruptcy relief looms large in the face of a tribal entity’s 
default.156 This uncertainty about whether relief is available and what form it 
will take increases transaction costs at the lending stage and may deter non-tribal 
entities from entering into loans with tribes and their affiliated businesses.157 In 
some cases, lack of access to bankruptcy gives creditors leverage over a business 
in distress: without the threat of bankruptcy looming, creditors may be able to 
coerce distressed entities into accepting terms that favor them and/or give them 
substantial control over operations.158 
In the tribal gaming context, the IGRA’s restrictions on equity in a tribal 
business may prevent creditors from exercising some traditional remedies, such 
as foreclosure on tribal property or a debt-for-equity swap.159 But even gaming 
lenders retain some leverage. For example, gaming lenders can freeze the credit 
markets for tribal gaming entities if a gaming business refuses to cooperate or 
negotiate in good faith.160 The gaming industry in particular is incredibly reliant 
on credit, so an industry-wide freeze would be particularly harmful.161 Lenders 
can also take steps to increase their leverage by asking the National Indian 
Gaming Commission, which approves contracts, for a determination that their 
loan agreement is not a “management agreement” under the IGRA, such that any 
sovereign immunity waivers the gaming company executes would be 
enforceable.162 Additionally, lenders who transact with non-gaming tribal 
 
 155 See Stephan A. Hoover, Forcing the Tribe to Bet on the House the Limited Options and Risks to the 
Tribe When Indian Gaming Operations Seek Bankruptcy Relief, 49 CAL. W.L. REV. 269 (2013); cf. Barry E. 
Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 811 (1994) (arguing that “a world without debt or bankruptcy 
. . . is efficient”). 
 156 Hoover, supra note 155. 
 157 See Hogan, supra note 10; Thomas Weathers, Encouraging Business with Indian Tribes: A Brief 
Discussion of the Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2008, https://apps. 
americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2008-11-12/weathers.shtml (noting that many nonnative companies and lawyers 
“may hesitate to do business with Indian tribes for fear of the unknown”); Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 
223 (suggesting that tribes might reassure investors by structuring contracts “with an eye to facilitating federal 
court intervention in disputes . . . .”). 
 158 See David McAfee, Marijuana Industry Can’t Partake in Bankruptcy Protection, BLOOMBERG BNA 
29 BBLR 717 (June 20, 2017). 
 159 Scott J. Greenberg & Jeffrey H. Taub, When Tribal Gaming Goes Sour… Rights & Remedies in an 
Unclear Legal Environment, CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, Apr. 11, 2011, https://www.lexology. 
com/library/detail.aspx?g=d7d11d74-d3a9-45dd-ba14-5ed3d20d34dd. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
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businesses may have more traditional remedies available to them in the face of 
a tribal business unable or unwilling to repay debt. 
Tribal entities in fiscal distress currently face a no-win situation: their 
uncertain eligibility status, combined with the incompatibility of the Bankruptcy 
Code with other laws and policies governing tribes, make using the existing 
bankruptcy system difficult if not impossible. Nevertheless, tribal entities 
seeking comprehensive debt relief have nowhere else to turn if they have 
engaged in commerce with other entities. This is because tribal law cannot be 
used to “bind dissenting non-tribal lenders.”163 In addition, bankruptcy offers 
distinct benefits—including an automatic stay preventing creditor action and the 
ability to restructure debt over the objection of creditors—traditionally 
unavailable outside of the Bankruptcy Code.164 Thus, tribal law on its own is not 
a substitute for bankruptcy when a tribal entity has engaged in commercial 
transactions with non-tribal entities. If tribal insolvency law cannot address the 
debt restructuring, and if Indian nations are similarly precluded from using the 
Bankruptcy Code, this suggests that Congress should devise a path for relief.165 
As tribal entities continue to engage in commerce with others, it will become 
increasingly likely that they will encounter the same risks that all businesses 
face, including debt overhang, holdout creditors, and the need for breathing 
space to adjust debts. Indeed, the rise of claims trading and distressed debt 
purchases, where parties with no prior interests in the debtor purchase claims in 
the hope of making a large return or to thwart a reorganization, makes it likely 
that tribal entities, like other U.S. businesses, will be faced with increasing 
numbers of creditors uninterested in a consensual debt restructuring.166 
Bankruptcy is distinctly equipped to address these problems by providing access 
 
 163 Kim & Koenig, supra note 17. The tribal exhaustion doctrine, which requires litigants to exhaust their 
tribal remedies before proceeding in state or federal court, likely does not apply to bankruptcy cases because 
federal law designates federal courts as the exclusive fora for bankruptcy claims. See Weathers, supra note 157 
(“Exhaustion is not required where . . . federal law expressly provides that a claim can only be heard in federal 
court.”) 
 164 For an in-depth discussion of bankruptcy’s unique attributes, see Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong, 
supra note 11, at 1206–07. Of course, as described infra, recently Congress has expanded access to bankruptcy 
tools to entities not eligible for Code-based relief. 
 165 For a similar argument in the contexts of municipal bankruptcy and Puerto Rico, see Mitu Gulati & 
Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 
133, 149 (2017) (“[T]he power to enact a debt adjustment scheme is an integral part of a state’s sovereign power, 
and . . . Congress cannot take that power away and put nothing in its place.”). 
 166 See generally Randolph J. Haines & John Worth, Trading in Bankruptcy Claims, 1992 ANN. SURV. OF 
BANKR. L. 1 (1992) (explaining various motivations for trading in bankruptcy claims); Anthony J. Casey, 
Auction Design for Claims Trading, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 133 (2014) (“Claims are traded regularly 
in today’s large corporate bankruptcy cases . . . the volume has increased dramatically in the last decade.”). 
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to specific tools, namely nonconsensual debt adjustment and the automatic stay, 
that are not available elsewhere.167 At bottom, when tribes and tribal businesses 
have a demonstrated need for these relief mechanisms, they should be able to 
access these tools. 
* * * 
There are valid concerns about granting tribal debtors access to bankruptcy 
and about the ways in which the Code conflicts with other federal laws, 
regulations, and policies toward tribes. Despite these concerns, access to 
structured debt relief can provide distinct benefits for Indian nations, including 
increased certainty, more options for tribal entities struggling with debts or 
holdout creditors, and the ability to access a valuable set of tools traditionally 
defined by access to the Bankruptcy Code. 
Tribes that engage in commerce with non-tribal entities are effectively 
injecting themselves onto a broader commercial playing field. Indeed, Indian 
nations often willingly submit themselves to non-tribal law in commercial 
circumstances by, for example, waiving sovereign immunity as a concession to 
doing business.168 If tribal laws, norms, and customs can be reconciled with 
Western ones in the commercial context, it seems inappropriate to limit the debt 
relief tribal entities can obtain by foreclosing tribal debtors’ access to bankruptcy 
relief. The next Part will discuss what appropriate bankruptcy relief for tribal 
entities might look like. Recent experiences suggest that when the Bankruptcy 
Code excludes a particular prospective debtor, it is not necessary to try and 
reconcile the Code with conflicting laws that apply to that entity. Instead, 
Congress can enact special legislation that provides structured debt relief tailor-
made for entities not eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.  
 
 167 See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH. 
U.L. REV. 1191 (2017); see also Michelle M. Harner, Rethinking Preemption and Constitutional Parameters in 
Bankruptcy, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 198 (2017) (noting that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly described 
a discharge of a debtor’s financial obligations as one of the hallmarks of a bankruptcy law that is within the 
exclusive purview of Congress under the Bankruptcy Clause”); Lubben, supra note 51, at 10 (“Insolvency 
systems are designed for debtors that risk having their value destroyed by individualistic creditor behavior.”). 
 168 See ROBERT J. MILLER, RESERVATION CAPITALISM: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 98 
(Univ. Neb. Press 2013) (noting that “there are literally thousands of examples of tribal governments voluntarily 
waiving their immunity in contracts” and citing the Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Indian Reservation in 
Oregon, which had waived immunity in thirty-five of its approximately 275 business contracts). 
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II. SEARCHING FOR RELIEF: THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND BEYOND 
If we accept that tribal debtors should be eligible for structured debt relief, 
we must next consider where such relief should come from. Scholars have made 
various proposals to reform or adapt the Bankruptcy Code to provide a clearer 
path for tribal eligibility. Others have suggested that non-bankruptcy 
mechanisms, such as bailouts, may be more appropriate forms of debt relief. 
After critically reviewing existing proposals, this Part examines the possibility 
of taking an alternate path: looking outside the Bankruptcy Code to design tailor-
made structured debt relief.  
A. Existing Proposals 
Observers have long been troubled by tribal entities’ lack of access to 
bankruptcy relief. Over the years, they have proposed various mechanisms to 
create access for these entities. This subsection surveys existing proposals and 
offers some commentary on their potential benefits and drawbacks. 
1. Proposals for Determining Eligibility 
Several proposals deal with the question of how to deem tribal entities 
eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Code. A recent proposal suggests that 
courts find that Native American commercial entities are eligible for bankruptcy 
using the Tuscarora-Coeur D’Alene doctrine.169 This doctrine splits tribal 
activities into two categories: those that are “governmental” and those that are 
“commercial” in nature.170 The doctrine divides tribal pursuits so that tribal 
economic activities can be regulated in a manner similar to private-sector 
business activities in the contexts of federal employment and benefits laws.171  
The Tuscarora-Coeur D’Alene doctrine derives from two cases. In the first, 
Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that “a general statute in terms applying to all persons includes 
Indians and their property interests.”172 In the second, Donavan v. Coeur 
D’Alene Tribal Farm, the Ninth Circuit limited the application of Tuscarora, 
holding that it does not apply if (1) the law in question deals with intramural 
tribal self-governance; (2) application would contradict relevant treaties; or (3) 
 
 169 Amanda L. Cartwright, Can Native American-Owned Casinos File for Chapter 11?, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., Oct. 2012, at 50. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 51. 
 172 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960). 
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legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend for the law to 
abrogate tribal sovereignty.173 
The synthesized Tuscarora-Coeur D’Alene doctrine has been applied to find 
that Native American commercial activities, including casino operations, are 
subject to acts of Congress.174 The doctrine thus limits tribal sovereign immunity 
to purely intramural governmental matters.175 Using the proposal in question, a 
court could extend the doctrine to the Bankruptcy Code to find that Native 
American commercial entities are subject to U.S. bankruptcy law and that they 
are eligible for bankruptcy.176  
Another suggestion for tribal debtor eligibility comes from the immunity 
doctrine.177 An early motivation for granting tribes sovereign immunity was the 
fear that tribes might otherwise be subjected to economic hardship.178 Indeed, 
many Indian nations are still in a precarious economic state such that they are 
not financially strong enough to withstand suit.179 Some have argued that if a 
tribal entity is protected by immunity, it has less of a need to file for bankruptcy 
due to this protection.180 Courts could therefore use the immunity doctrine to 
determine whether a tribe’s sovereignty precludes the entity from filing for 
bankruptcy.181 For example, under this proposal, a tribal business may not be 
covered by tribal immunity and may thus be able to access the bankruptcy 
system if (1) the business is sufficiently distinct from the tribe or (2) the tribe 
voluntarily waives the immunity upon incorporation.182 Thus, under this 
proposal, there would be two categories of tribal enterprises: (1) those protected 
by immunity that cannot file for bankruptcy, and (2) those without immunity 
that can file.183 This approach appears similar to the one the court in the Santa 
Ysabel Resort and Casino case used to determine that the business in that case 
was ineligible for bankruptcy. 
 
 173 Donovan v. Coeur D’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 174 Cartwright, supra note 169, at 103. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id.; see also San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. N.L.R.B., 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding 
that National Labor Relations Act applied to an Indian-owned casino because applying the Act to a tribe’s 
commercial activities would not impair tribal sovereignty). 
 177 Hogan, supra note 10, at 571. 
 178 Id. at 590. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. at 614. 
 181 Id. at 613. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. 
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Finally, Emir Aly Crowne, Andrew Black and S. Alex Constantin have 
argued that when a tribal corporate entity voluntarily enters into a business 
contract with non-tribal investors, that entity must be made subject to both 
bankruptcy law and to the terms of the agreements it undertakes because 
“[b]eing a commercial participant entails being commercially responsible.”184 
These scholars contend that when a tribe voluntarily enters the public 
marketplace in a commercial capacity, it is subjecting itself to all of the relevant 
rules and regulations of that space, including the rules of bankruptcy.185 
The above proposals offer various pathways to tribal eligibility for 
bankruptcy but do not explain how a tribal bankruptcy should proceed once the 
entity is deemed eligible. As the discussion in Part I shows, conflicts between 
the Bankruptcy Code and other federal laws that apply to tribes present the need 
for clarification and adjustment before a tribal debtor can proceed with 
bankruptcy. Thus, although there is uncertainty surrounding eligibility that 
should be clarified, if tribal debtors are to successfully use the bankruptcy 
system, the inquiry cannot stop at the eligibility stage. 
2. Alternative Mechanisms  
A second group of proposals calls for exploration of alternative mechanisms 
to assist tribes. For example, Blake Quackenbush has proposed using chapter 15 
for tribal bankruptcy, arguing that this chapter of the Bankruptcy Code may 
“bridge the jurisdictional gap between tribal courts and U.S. [b]ankruptcy 
courts.”186  
Chapter 15, which was designed to facilitate cooperation between U.S. 
courts and foreign courts in cross-border insolvency cases,187 may not be a good 
fit for Indian nations for several reasons. First, Indian tribes are distinct from the 
foreign states where companies seeking to use chapter 15 are based, as 
Quackenbush himself acknowledges.188 Due to the restraints on tribal 
sovereignty discussed in Part I, treating a tribe as the equivalent of a sovereign 
nation for purposes of chapter 15 bankruptcy recognition is a technically 
difficult proposition. In particular, chapter 15 presupposes that the other 
sovereigns involved in a case have well-developed laws and public policies 
 
 184 Emir Aly Crowne, Andrew Black, & S. Alex Constantin, Not Out of the (Fox)Woods Yet: Indian 
Gaming and the Bankruptcy Code, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 25, 26 (2011). 
 185 Id. at 44. 
 186 Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 69. 
 187 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq. 
 188 See Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 76. 
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related to bankruptcy. Thus, to use chapter 15 successfully, tribes would have to 
enact “substantial portions” of the Bankruptcy Code—portions which, due to 
their conflicts with the IGRA and other federal Indian law, would need to be 
further adapted for tribal use.189 In all, applying chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy 
Code to accommodate tribal debtors would require significant adaptations, to 
both chapter 15’s application and to tribal law itself. Thus, simply arguing that 
tribal debtors should use chapter 15 does not resolve the conflicts identified in 
Part I. 
An alternative proposal suggests that Congress could simply consider a 
bailout for fiscally distressed tribal entities.190 A bailout for tribal debtors is not 
as simple as it may seem, however. Bailout proposals are politically charged and 
are often extremely unpopular, with many contending that an offer of a bailout 
encourages reckless behavior.191 In addition, if numerous tribal entities were 
suffering from severe financial distress, due perhaps to another acute recession, 
Congress may be in the difficult position of having to pick and choose which 
Indian nations it would offer to bail out.192 Thus, bailouts may be both politically 
unpopular and economically undesirable. 
In sum, alternatives to traditionally considered avenues for tribal bankruptcy 
are creative but likely difficult to implement, requiring adjustment in both legal 
and political contexts.  
3. Clarification 
The final set of proposals simply calls for clarification to the Bankruptcy 
Code when it comes to tribes.193 In particular, Congress could refine provisions 
relating to tribes’ status and eligibility under the Code, as well as whether Indian 
nations may be subject to involuntary bankruptcy petitions.194 One commentator 
 
 189 See Quackenbush, supra note 10, at 81–82. 
 190 See Waterman, supra note 110, at 87. 
 191 See, e.g., Sita Slavov, The Hidden Cost of Bank Bailouts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 26, 
2013, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2013/09/26/study-shows-bank-bailouts-are-an-
incentive-to-be-reckless (citing research that suggests bailing out banks “made the financial system riskier”); 
Daniel Mitchell, Why the Bailout is Bad for America, REALCLEARPOLITICS, Oct. 1, 2008, https://www. 
realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/10/financial_bailout_would_impose.html (arguing that bailouts “will hurt 
the U.S. economy in the short run and long run”). 
 192 See Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3120145 (“Bailouts 
create opportunities for government favoritism.”). 
 193 See Clift, supra note 10, at 207. 
 194 See id. 
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has suggested that Congress settle the matter of tribal eligibility using either 
“appropriate legislation or statutory amendment to the Code.”195  
Cohen’s Handbook on Federal Indian Law notes that applying the Code to 
tribal government debtors is “problematic” and suggests that these debtors be 
dealt with “by the tribes themselves and by the executive or legislative branches 
of the federal government.”196 Yet, Cohen’s Handbook also notes that tribally 
owned business entities “should be entitled to petition in bankruptcy.”197 
Cohen’s Handbook does not, however, elaborate on how issues with tribal 
government debtors should be addressed nor on how a tribal business might 
navigate the Bankruptcy Code if deemed eligible to file. 
In other words, amending the Code or creating new legislation with tribes 
specifically in mind would provide clarity where there is currently only 
confusion. This Article has already detailed the challenges that amending the 
Code would entail, given the significant conflicts with the IGRA and other 
federal laws. However, providing clarity through “appropriate legislation” is an 
as-yet-underexplored avenue. 
* * * 
Although the existing proposals contemplate various ways in which tribal 
debtors could access the bankruptcy system, none have resolved the thornier 
problem of reconciling the Bankruptcy Code with the body of federal law, 
policy, and customs relating to Indian nations. Indeed, scholars have been unable 
to articulate how a bankruptcy would proceed should a tribal debtor be deemed 
eligible.198 Until recently, the prospect of structured debt relief for tribal debtors 
seemed inconceivable. As the next subsection explains, however, recent events 
offer significant promise on this front. 
B. Specialized Laws for Otherwise Ineligible Entities 
This subsection provides the necessary backdrop for this Article’s proposal: 
Congress should enact special legislation providing tailored bankruptcy relief to 
tribes. Although this proposal may seem radical, it is not unprecedented. Indeed, 
Congress has twice recognized that the Bankruptcy Code is not an appropriate 
 
 195 Id. at 252. 
 196 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 2.03. 
 197 Id. 
 198 See Pandeli, supra note 51, at 274–79 (concluding that a chapter 7 liquidation would be “legally 
challenging, impractical and against federal policy with respect to Indian tribes” and that a chapter 11 
reorganization would come with “caveats,” including an inability to use a debt-for-equity swap). 
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solution and has instead adopted new and entirely personalized debt relief laws, 
once in the context of Puerto Rico, and once in the context of financial 
institutions. Each will be discussed in turn. 
1. PROMESA 
In 2016, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and 
Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”),199 marking a new approach to 
bankruptcy law in the United States.200 PROMESA is not a pure bankruptcy law; 
rather, the legislation recognizes Puerto Rico’s unique status as a U.S. territory 
with a complicated debt structure, providing a mixture of Bankruptcy Code-
based rules and procedures and sovereign debt restructuring practices to aid 
Puerto Rico in its financial struggles.201 
PROMESA, which was passed in response to Puerto Rico’s severe economic 
crisis, was designed uniquely for Puerto Rico and has no application to other 
U.S. debtors, including other U.S. territories.202 Signed into law by President 
Obama, PROMESA allows Puerto Rico to enter into a form of bankruptcy and 
creates a financial oversight board to govern the territory’s fiscal decisions.203 
PROMESA has been described as one of “the most collaborative and bipartisan 
pieces of legislation” that Congress has passed in recent years.204 
PROMESA’s enactment occurred one day before Puerto Rico defaulted on 
substantial payment obligations,205 and the events leading up to PROMESA’s 
passage were turbulent. In 2014, Puerto Rico, already deeply in debt and 
concerned that its municipalities were not eligible for relief under the 
 
 199 See PROMESA: A Summary of the Puerto Rico Oversight Legislation, KUTAK ROCK NEWS & 
PUBLICATIONS, Sept. 7, 2016, http://www.kutakrock.com/PROMESA-Puerto-Rico-Oversight-Economic-
Stability-Act/ [hereinafter PROMESA Summary]. 
 200 See Cheryl D. Block, Federal Policy for Financially-Distressed Subnational Governments: The U.S. 
States and Puerto Rico, 53 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 215, 232 (2017) (describing PROMESA as a “hybrid 
procedural approach to restructuring Puerto Rico’s otherwise unpayable debt”). 
 201 See id.; see also James Spiotto, Beyond Hurricane Maria: Federal Action in Puerto Rico with 
PROMESA, MUNINET GUIDE, Dec. 7, 2017, https://muninetguide.com/federal-action-in-puerto-rico/ (noting 
that PROMESA was designed to be a mixture of past mechanisms used to resolve governmental financial 
distress). 
 202 See Sheelah Kolhatkar, Profiting from Puerto Rico’s Pain, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 6, 2017) (noting 
that Puerto Rico has been described as “America’s own Third World country”). 
 203 See id. 
 204 See Melissa Jacoby, Aurelius Seeks a Do-Over; Puerto Rico and the Appointments Clause Litigation, 
CREDIT SLIPS, Jan. 8, 2018, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/01/aurelius-seeks-a-do-over-puerto-
rico-appointments-clause-litigation.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed 
%3A+creditslips%2Ffeed+%28Credit+Slips%29. 
 205 See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199. 
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Bankruptcy Code,206 passed its own Recovery Act to try and address its 
problems firsthand.207 The Recovery Act would have enabled some of Puerto 
Rico’s instrumentalities to adopt debt restructuring plans.208 The U.S. Supreme 
Court quickly declared the Recovery Act invalid on the grounds that the 
Bankruptcy Code preempted the Act.209 According to the Court, Puerto Rico 
was subject to the Bankruptcy Code, even though its municipalities were 
ineligible to file under the Code, because the territory fell within the Code’s 
definition of a “State.”210 Therefore, the Recovery Act was preempted by the 
Bankruptcy Code’s provision prohibiting states from enacting their own 
bankruptcy legislation. Puerto Rico’s path to structured debt relief thus entailed 
exhausting all possible legal options before Congress acted. 
PROMESA is “the first of its kind in many respects.”211 Key features of the 
Act include an automatic stay, which stayed all actions and litigation against 
Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities to collect or enforce liabilities or claims 
and actions to possess or control their property;212 the oversight board, which 
has broad authority and discretion over the territory;213 a path for Puerto Rico 
and its instrumentalities to file a case to reorganize debts via a plan of 
adjustment;214 and provisions for collective creditor action to modify bond 
terms.215 Many Bankruptcy Code provisions are incorporated into PROMESA, 
including the Code’s conditions for a court to confirm a bankruptcy plan.216 Yet 
overall, PROMESA goes beyond Code-based bankruptcy relief to address 
Puerto Rico’s unique needs as a territory.217 As much as PROMESA and the 
Bankruptcy Code share certain characteristics, PROMESA makes significant 
departures from the Code, notably in the inclusion of the oversight board and 
 
 206 The Bankruptcy Code “allows only the municipalities of states to declare bankruptcy.” Jose A. 
Cabranes, 3 Main Reasons Why Puerto Rico Can’t Declare Bankruptcy, BUSINESS INSIDER, July 22, 2015, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/3-main-reasons-why-puerto-rico-cant-declare-bankruptcy-2015-7 (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2018) (emphasis in original). 
 207 See id.; Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, 2014 P.R. Laws Act No. 
71. 
 208 See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199. 
 209 See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938. 
 210 See id. The Court also noted, however, that Puerto Rico was not a “State” for purposes of determining 
whether a state’s municipalities may be debtors under the Code. Id. 
 211 PROMESA Summary, supra note 199. 
 212 See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2194 (2016). 
 213 See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199. 
 214 See generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §2161 et 
seq. (2016). 
 215 See PROMESA summary, supra note 199; Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic 
Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. § 2231 et seq. (2016). 
 216 See PROMESA Summary, supra note 199. 
 217 See id. 
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creditor collective action clauses, as well as in allowing the territory itself to 
adjust all of its debts “in a comprehensive process.”218 “PROMESA is thus not 
solely for the purpose of adjusting or reorganizing the debts of Puerto Rico or 
covered instrumentalities, but has broader purposes.”219 
Since its passage, PROMESA, and the oversight board in particular, have 
been the subject of much debate and criticism. In 2017, one of Puerto Rico’s 
creditors, hedge fund Aurelius Capital Management, sued, seeking a dismissal 
of the debt relief proceedings and a declaration that the oversight board was 
unconstitutional.220 Notably, Aurelius argued that the board’s creation violated 
the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.221 Although the board’s members 
answer to the President, their appointments were never confirmed by the 
Senate.222 Aurelius also argued that the process for appointing the board’s 
members violates separation of powers principles.223 Namely, six out of the 
seven board members were, according to Aurelius, “hand-picked” by 
Congress.224 Aurelius sought to bar the oversight board from operating until it 
has been “validly constituted.”225 
Although the court ultimately held that establishment of the oversight board 
was constitutional,226 the Aurelius litigation highlights some of the uncertainties 
that can be exploited in new legislation such as PROMESA. In addition, because 
PROMESA is different from a typical U.S. bankruptcy proceeding, Puerto Rico 
and those affected by its financial crisis have had to hire numerous experts to 
help interpret the law and chart the way forward.227 The Puerto Rican 
 
 218 Colin Dwyer, Puerto Rico Makes Unprecedented Move to Restructure Billions in Debt, NPR, May 3, 
2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/03/526750751/puerto-rico-makes-unprecedented-
move-to-restructure-tens-of-billions-in-debt (calling PROMESA “a bankruptcy process custom-built for Puerto 
Rico’s debt crisis”). 
 219 PROMESA Summary, supra note 215. 
 220 Tom Hals, Aurelius Hedge Fund Seeks to Toss Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Filing, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-bankruptcy/aurelius-hedge-fund-seeks-to-toss-
puerto-ricos-bankruptcy-filing-idUSKBN1AN27H. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Opinion and Order Denying the Aurelius Motinos to Dismiss the Title III Petition and for Relief from 
the Automatic Stay, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., No. 17 BK 3283-LTS, Doc. # 3503 (Jul. 13, 
2018). 
 227 Elizabeth Olson, Judge Pushes Back Against $75M in Fees for Puerto Rico Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG 
BNA BANKR. L. REP. (Mar. 19, 2018) (quoting the court-appointed fee examiner’s report, which stated that the 
Puerto Rico bankruptcy presents “profound” legal issues and that “financial and legal professionals working on 
these cases have confronted massive challenges of time and distance, analysis and advocacy, with little directly 
applicable precedent”). 
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government alone had paid nearly $300 million to advisors as of November 
2017, with the amount projected to grow as the territory continues to pursue a 
debt restructuring under the new law.228 As the territory already does not have 
enough money to go around, funds paid to advisors represent money that will 
not go toward paying creditors. 
Austerity measures229 and the influence of the oversight board have also 
been the subject of substantial criticism. On the island, the board is colloquially 
known as “La Junta,” a reference to a ruling group that comes to power by 
force.230 Protests have erupted in San Juan, Puerto Rico’s capital, in response to 
the board and the measures it has imposed.231 Residents and observers have 
expressed concern that “the whole democratic process [is breaking] down” due 
to PROMESA.232 Even the United Nation’s Commissioner on Human Rights 
has weighed in, noting that “Puerto Rico’s human rights [are]…being massively 
undermined by the economic and financial crisis and austerity policies.”233 
In passing PROMESA, Congress made a deliberate choice to pursue an 
individualized solution to Puerto Rico’s pressing debt problems.234 As scholars 
have observed, Congress could have chosen to amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
extend its relief to Puerto Rico and its political subdivisions.235 The fact that 
chapter 9 of the Code did not apply to Puerto Rico’s municipalities has even 
been described as a “technical error.”236 
 
 228 Kolhatkar, supra note 202 (“If we don’t come out of this with a new and super-improved Puerto Rico 
. . . this has just been a total waste of time.”). 
 229 See Michelle Kaske, Greek Tragedy Redux? Puerto Rico Embraces Risky Austerity Plan, BLOOMBERG 
BNA BANKR. L. REP., Mar. 15, 2018 (describing an austerity-focused plan promulgated by Puerto Rico’s 
governor and noting that “self-imposed discipline is bound to increase the pain, much as it did in Greece”). 
 230 Ed Morales, Puerto Rico’s Political and Economic Crisis Deepens, THE NATION, May 24, 2017, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/puerto-ricos-political-economic-crisis-deepens/. 
 231 Id. (“The fiscal oversight board is seen on the island as an external force, emblematic of Puerto Rico’s 
second-class status.”). 
 232 Id. 
 233 “Puerto Rico: Human Rights Concerns Mount in Absence of Adequate Emergency Response,” U.N. 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, Oct. 30, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/ 
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22326&LangID=E. 
 234 For an argument that Title III of PROMESA violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy 
Clause, see Stephen J. Lubben, PROMESA and the Bankruptcy Clause: A Reminder About Uniformity, 12 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 53, 54–55 (2017) (suggesting that extension of PROMESA to include the U.S. 
Virgin Islands could “potentially defuse the uniformity issue”). 
 235 John A. E. Pottow, What Bankruptcy Law Can and Cannot Do for Puerto Rico, 85 REV. JR. U.P.R. 689, 
700 (2016).  
 236 Id. (“I testified a year ago urging Congress to fix [the error], but for mysterious reasons it has not yet 
done so despite long-pending legislation.”). 
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In creating a debt restructuring path for Puerto Rico outside of the 
Bankruptcy Code, Congress demonstrated that for certain entities, in this case 
territories with “layers upon layers of debt,”237 ordinary bankruptcy law is inapt. 
As a quasi-sovereign U.S. territory, Puerto Rico is situated differently from other 
debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.238 PROMESA is thus an example of 
Congress’ ability to design tailored bankruptcy relief for special entities.  
The experience with PROMESA lends further support to extending 
specialized bankruptcy relief to tribal entities. Thanks in part to their quasi-
sovereign status, tribal entities face roadblocks to using the Bankruptcy Code. 
Yet, PROMESA also serves as a cautionary tale of the repercussions of waiting 
for a crisis to strike before passing legislation. Puerto Rico’s financial crisis and 
legal limbo spurred Congress to act; if Congress had deliberated more 
thoroughly on PROMESA’s effects on the commonwealth and its citizens, it 
could perhaps have avoided some of the problems Puerto Rico is facing as it 
struggles to adjust its debt under the guidance of the oversight board. 
2. Dodd-Frank 
After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress saw the need for serious bank 
financial reform.239 Banks are ineligible to file under the Bankruptcy Code; 
instead, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) can exercise 
substantial control when a bank becomes insolvent.240 In 2010, Congress passed 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-
Frank Act” or the “Act”) to provide comprehensive regulatory reform and to 
better prepare banks to face fiscal distress.241  
The Dodd-Frank Act was designed to mitigate the systemic risk of the 
collapse of significant financial institutions.242 The Act created the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, which monitors U.S. financial markets, and requires 
certain large financial companies to submit periodic reports and “living wills” 
 
 237 Pottow, supra note 235, at 701. 
 238 See, e.g., Frank Shafroth, Fiscal Economic Dislocation?, THE GMU MUNICIPAL SUSTAINABILITY 
PROJECT, Jan. 22, 2017, https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/fiscal-economic-dislocation/ 
(describing federal tax reform that “treats Puerto Rico as a foreign jurisdiction”). 
 239 The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet, MORRISON & FOERSTER, 2010, http://media.mofo.com/files/ 
uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf. 
 240 See generally Hynes & Walt, supra note 13 (explaining that the FDIC acts as a receiver when a bank 
becomes insolvent). In contrast, bank holding companies can and do file for bankruptcy. Id. at 987 n.2. 
 241 The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 239, at 2. 
 242 Post of David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, HARV. L. 
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG., July 7, 2010, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/ 
summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulation-legislation/. 
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that outline steps to be taken in the event of financial distress.243 Notably, the 
Act established a so-called “orderly liquidation mechanism,” which allows the 
FDIC to seize, break up, and wind down a failing financial company whose 
failure would threaten financial stability across the U.S.244 In its role as a 
receiver for these institutions, the FDIC wields significant powers, including the 
power to take over and manage the company’s assets, merge the company with 
another company, create a “bridge financial company,” and transfer any of the 
company’s assets or liabilities without approval.245 Under the same orderly 
liquidation provisions, the government can provide a loan to the failing financial 
institution, and such loan must be backed by the assets of the firm and recovered 
either in the resolution process itself or from the largest members of the financial 
industry.246 
Like tribal debtors, financial institutions cannot use the Bankruptcy Code as 
currently constituted. Indeed, “the failure of a systemically important financial 
institution is materially different from that of most non-financial businesses.”247 
Yet, Congress provided tools to aid these struggling financial institutions. 
Congress did not enact bankruptcy relief for financial institutions;248 however, 
it did provide these institutions with a set of tools tailored to address their unique 
status and position in the United States. Like a big bank failure, the financial 
failure of tribal entities is materially different from that of a non-tribal entity, in 
particular given the tribal entity’s need to coordinate with other federal 
regulators. 
 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id.; Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (noting that Dodd-Frank “includes an ‘Orderly Liquidation Authority,’ that 
gives federal regulators broad powers to place failing ‘financial companies’…that pose systemic risk into a 
receivership administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”). 
 245 Huntington, supra note 242. 
 246 Id. 
 247 Levitin, supra note 244. 
 248 Congress has recently been contemplating bankruptcy for banks. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 
10 (proposing to replace Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority with a bankruptcy procedure to address 
the failure of systemically important financial institutions). For a discussion as to why bankruptcy is inapt for 
banks, see, e.g., Mark Roe, Don’t Bank on Bankruptcy for Banks, PROJECT SYNDICATE, Oct. 18, 2017, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bank-bankruptcy-regulations-by-mark-roe-2017-10 
(“Restructuring a mega-bank requires pre-planning, familiarity with the bank’s strengths and weaknesses, 
knowledge of how to time the bankruptcy properly in a volatile economy, and the capacity to coordinate with 
foreign regulators.”). 
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III. DESIGNING TRIBAL DEBT RELIEF 
PROMESA and the Dodd-Frank Act illustrate two instances where Congress 
looked beyond the Bankruptcy Code to provide relief for entities that were not 
included in the Code’s eligibility provisions. Like territories and financial 
institutions, tribes are not contemplated as prospective debtors under the 
Bankruptcy Code. And just as Puerto Rico and many banks found themselves in 
situations where a debt restructuring was desirable, Indian nations and their 
businesses may encounter similar scenarios. It is thus not inconceivable that 
Congress would enact structured debt relief for tribal entities. And, as 
PROMESA and Dodd-Frank show, this debt relief need not come from the 
Bankruptcy Code. Instead, Congress can create specialized legislation for 
entities for whom use of the Code would be impractical.  
This Part sketches out some key features of structured debt relief for tribal 
entities and flags potential issues to be resolved. Because this Article’s proposal 
calls for substantial input from the groups the legislation would impact, the 
Article does not attempt to draft the proposed legislation in detail. Rather, what 
follows are guidelines as to what specialized bankruptcy relief for tribal debtors 
should look like. 
A. Key Features and Benefits 
The previous Parts identified several major problems with allowing tribal 
debtors to use the Bankruptcy Code. Although tribal entities often engage in 
commerce as if they were ordinary commercial players, they simply cannot be 
treated like ordinary commercial debtors. Specialized bankruptcy legislation for 
tribal entities would give tribal debtors and their creditors the same certainty 
afforded to other entities when they take out loans or otherwise engage in 
commerce.  
1. Substance 
Bankruptcy laws for tribal debtors should provide these entities with access 
to the same basic tools afforded to other debtors under the Bankruptcy Code—
namely, protection from creditor debt collection attempts via an automatic stay, 
and the means to allow tribal debtors to liquidate (in the case of a tribal business 
entity) and to adjust their debts without the full consent of all creditors. These 
tools are the hallmarks of U.S. bankruptcy law and are part of what distinguish 
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bankruptcy from other forms of debt relief.249 Thus, the general purpose of a 
tribal bankruptcy law should be consistent with bankruptcy’s overarching goals: 
resolving debt overhang, eliminating holdout creditors, and providing breathing 
space to financially distressed debtors. 
To achieve these goals, however, adjustments will have to be made to 
acknowledge the ways in which tribal debtors are uniquely situated. For 
example, although tribes are sovereign, tribal sovereignty is unlike the 
sovereignty of an independent nation, whose sovereignty cannot be abrogated 
by a higher power.250 If bankruptcy law is to apply to tribal entities, it is 
important that bankruptcy not overly detract from tribal sovereignty. Specialized 
bankruptcy legislation should therefore recognize Indian nations’ unique status 
and contain provisions that balance respect for tribal sovereignty with the goals 
of bankruptcy law. For example, any tribal bankruptcy should be voluntary,251 
meaning that the bankruptcy process should be initiated only by the tribal entity 
itself, rather than a creditor or other party in interest. In this way, tribal debtors 
will not be forced into bankruptcy. In addition, tribal debtors should be granted 
exclusivity,252 meaning that they should be the only entities able to propose a 
plan of liquidation or debt adjustment. Incorporating these elements into the 
legislation protects tribal sovereignty interests. In addition, these provisions may 
make tribes who are not involved in commerce feel more comfortable with the 
legislation, since they will not be forced into a bankruptcy filing or forced to 
comply with a plan imposed upon them.253 
The sovereign nature of Native American tribes suggests that a tribal 
bankruptcy law could also draw upon sovereign debt restructuring tools, for 
example by providing for the use of collective creditor action to modify the 
terms of a debt instrument. Similar to what Congress did in PROMESA, tribal 
bankruptcy law could draw from a mixture of sovereign debt restructuring tools 
 
 249 See Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong, supra note 167, at 1206–07 (delineating bankruptcy’s unique 
functions). 
 250 See “The Issue of Sovereignty,” GLOBALIZATION 101 (2016), http://www.globalization101.org/the-
issue-of-sovereignty/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) (“State sovereignty is the concept that states are in complete 
and exclusive control of all the people and property within their territory.”). 
 251 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (“A voluntary case . . . is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a 
petition…by an entity that may be a debtor.”). 
 252 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (noting that “only the debtor may file a [chapter 11] plan until after 120 
days after the date” the bankruptcy petition is filed). 
 253 Such “opt-in” features have become a trend with respect to recent congressional legislation as it pertains 
to tribes. See, e.g., Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, H.R. 725, 111th Cong. (2010) (requiring tribes to actively 
opt in if they want expanded punitive abilities); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, S. 47, 
113th Cong. (2013) (designating “participating tribes,” which can elect to use special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction). 
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and domestic bankruptcy provisions that recognize that tribal debt might be 
hybrid in nature—a mix of ordinary commercial loans and loans and guarantees 
backed by the tribe itself. Incorporating sovereign debt restructuring practices 
into the proposed legislation may be particularly valuable if a tribe itself were to 
seek a debt restructuring, or if a tribal business entity’s debt was linked so 
closely to the tribe itself (i.e. through guarantees, cross-default provisions, or 
other contractual stipulations) that the tribe was heavily involved in the 
bankruptcy process.254 
Several other important features of the proposed law deserve consideration. 
It will be critical to establish rules for determining what property becomes 
property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate, available for distribution to creditors. 
It will also be necessary to develop a property distribution system that is fair to 
creditors yet respects external constraints such as the IGRA’s requirement that 
the tribe be in control of any tribal gaming operation. As a starting point for 
addressing these issues, Congress might look at bankruptcy reorganizations for 
nonprofits, churches, and heavily regulated entities. Courts have sometimes held 
that different rules apply in these bankruptcies,255 and scholars have offered 
creative proposals to reconcile the application of the Bankruptcy Code to 
nonprofit and church debtors.256 
A critical part of many bankruptcy cases is debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) 
lending, in which a creditor extends money to the debtor to allow the debtor to 
proceed in bankruptcy. DIP lenders may be creditors the debtor has previously 
dealt with, or they may be entirely new lenders. Regardless of their identity, DIP 
 
 254 Scholars have suggested, for example, that tribal governments might provide start-up loans and other 
sorts of funding to businesses operated on reservations. Miller, supra note 16, at 857–58. 
 255 See, e.g., In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that absolute priority 
rule was not violated when debtor’s plan contemplated cooperative members remaining in control of reorganized 
debtor); In re Whittaker Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 149 B.R. 812 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that absolute priority 
rule not violated when individuals retained control of a non-profit hospital after bankruptcy); In re Gen. 
Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local 890, 265 F.3d 869 (2001) (noting that the absolute priority 
rule is generally applied to for-profit corporations facing bankruptcy) (emphasis added). 
 256 There is a growing body of scholarly literature on this topic. See, e.g., Pamela Foohey, Chapter 11 
Reorganization and the Fair and Equitable Standard: How the Absolute Priority Rule Applies to All Nonprofit 
Entities, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 31 (2012) (arguing that the fair and equitable standard encompasses more than 
the absolute priority rule and that, viewed in this light, the rule can be applied to nonprofits); Amelia Rawls, 
Comment, Appling the Absolute Priority Rule to Nonprofit Enterprises in Bankruptcy, 118 YALE L.J. 1231 
(2009) (proposing a framework for courts to adjudicate absolute priority claims in nonprofit bankruptcies); Reid 
K. Weisbord, Charitable Insolvency and Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 10 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 305 (2013) (proposing for the appointment of bankruptcy examiners in nonprofit reorganizations 
involving substantial charitable assets because, among other problems, the absolute priority rule does not apply 
in this context). For a discussion of tensions that arise in church bankruptcy cases, see David A. Skeel, Jr. 
“Sovereignty” Issues and the Church Bankruptcy Cases, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 345 (2005). 
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lenders typically exercise a substantial amount of power and influence over the 
debtor during the case.257 Indeed, many scholars have expressed concern about 
the outsize influence of DIP lenders.258 Similarly, in the sovereign debt 
restructuring context, lenders who provide bailouts or other emergency funds to 
sovereign nations often attach stringent conditions to their loans and impose 
severe austerity measures.259 It will be important for tribal bankruptcy legislation 
to provide a DIP lending structure that does not accord undue influence to DIP 
lenders or to the U.S. government, which holds property in trust for many Indian 
nations. Giving the tribal debtor the exclusive ability to propose a plan may help 
curtail lenders’ influence. Another possibility would be to provide standards for 
adjudicator scrutiny over DIP loan terms to ensure that the terms are not unduly 
onerous for the tribal debtor and do not impinge upon tribes’ right to self-govern. 
Alternatively, using its plenary powers, Congress could simply allow trust 
properties to be offered to creditors when a tribal debtor is in bankruptcy. This 
could give tribal debtors a broader choice of potential DIP lenders as well as 
decrease the federal government’s oversight over trust properties.260  
In general, Congress should tread carefully when it comes to oversight of the 
debtor. Both PROMESA and the Dodd-Frank Act provide for substantial 
external oversight of the financially distressed entities in question. The 
PROMESA oversight board exercises significant authority over Puerto Rico and 
its instrumentalities,261 while the FDIC and other financial regulators exert 
substantial control over a struggling financial institution under the Dodd-Frank 
Act.262 As discussed, the oversight board in particular has been the subject of 
much criticism, as observers and critics note that it wields its power despite its 
members not being democratically elected.  
 
 257 Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (noting that “call[ing] the shots” in a bankruptcy case “is what DIP lenders 
do”). 
 258 See, e.g., Laura Napoli Coordes, The Geography of Bankruptcy, 68 VAND. L. REV. 381, 406–07 (2015) 
(critiquing occasions when “the debtor and its powerful supporters—including its lawyers and postpetition 
lenders—run every aspect of the case”); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Behind Closed Doors: The 
Influence of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1155, 1158 (2011) (noting that 
creditors’ self-interest is the most common reason for creditor disputes). 
 259 See, e.g., Laura N. Coordes, When Borders Dissolve, 93 CHI-KENT L. REV. 649 (2018) (describing the 
effects of austerity measures imposed in Greece). 
 260 Such an arrangement would have broader implications for the federal government’s relations with 
Indian nations, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 261 Morales, supra note 230. 
 262 Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (noting that Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority “gives federal 
regulators substantial discretion in whether to trigger the authority and gives the FDIC substantial discretion in 
implementing a receivership”). 
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As a measure of respect for tribal sovereignty, tribal bankruptcy legislation 
should break with this pattern of extreme external oversight and instead consider 
a more limited approach to interference with tribal affairs. The protests in Puerto 
Rico and the backlash from the United Nations, described previously, should 
serve as cautionary tales about the perils of enacting changes without the consent 
of the governed.263 To ensure minimal interference with tribal affairs, Congress 
could draw upon chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits undue 
influence with municipal affairs, for inspiration.264 Recognition that tribal 
entities carry potentially weighty sovereignty concerns is important to avoid the 
knee-jerk imposition of significant external oversight.  
Another key consideration will be the individual or panel running the 
proceedings. Entities restructuring their debts under the Bankruptcy Code do so 
primarily under the auspices of bankruptcy judges.265 In contrast, under 
PROMESA, a district court judge oversees the restructuring proceedings.266 
Although Congress’s precise reasons for choosing a district judge over a 
bankruptcy judge are unclear,267 the drafters may have believed there were 
distinct benefits to district court oversight that would inure to Puerto Rico, 
perhaps because unlike bankruptcy judges, district courts are Article III 
judges.268 Additionally, in sovereign debt restructurings, there is a growing 
practice of using arbitration to resolve claims.269 Thus, it need not be a given 
 
 263 See Coordes, When Borders Dissolve, supra note 259 (discussing the drawbacks of enacting significant 
changes in the absence of political will). For a view that PROMESA actually gives the oversight board too little 
power in certain respects, see David A. Skeel, Reflections on Two Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REVISTA 
JURIDICA UPR 862 (2018). 
 264 In practice, however, judges in chapter 9 cases regularly exercise substantial authority. See Laura N. 
Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249; Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and 
Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 58-59 (2016) (describing judicial work-arounds of 
chapter 9’s limitations); Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1206 (2016) (discussing ways judges can overcome chapter 9’s 
limitations and arguing that it is appropriate for judges to do so). 
 265 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (“Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under [the 
Bankruptcy Code].”). 
 266 48 U.S.C. § 2168 (“[T]he Chief Justice of the United States shall designate a district court judge to sit 
by designation to conduct the case.”). 
 267 See “Puerto Rico: PROMESA and Presiding Judges,” ABI, https://www.abi.org/feed-item/puerto-rico-
promesa-and-presiding-judges (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) (speculating that the Natural Resources Committee, 
which drafted PROMESA, “may not have been in the best position to appreciate the . . . risks” resulting from 
appointment of a district judge to oversee Puerto Rico’s restructuring proceedings). 
 268 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Presiding over Municipal Bankruptcies: Then, Now, and Puerto Rico, 91 AMER. 
BANKR. L.J. 375, 390 (2017) (questioning the accuracy of any perception of greater expertise on the part of these 
district judges and noting the “significant institutional costs of forfeiting the formidable body of substantive and 
procedural expertise a bankruptcy judge would have brought to the task”). 
 269 Abubakar Isa Umar & Muhammad Bello, The Utility of International Investment Arbitration in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 14 U.S.-CHINA L. REV. 335, 336 (2017) (“[D]espite initial skepticism, 
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that a bankruptcy judge oversee the case. Instead, the merits and drawbacks of 
various options, including bankruptcy and district court judges and arbitrators, 
should be discussed to determine the best fit. Among other factors, expertise, the 
desired role for a judge or arbitrator, and the ability of the parties to play a role 
in choosing the judges or arbitrators may be relevant to the ultimate decision.270 
For example, bankruptcy judges have specialized expertise in restructuring debt, 
something that may be valuable in the context of a potentially complex tribal 
case. On the other hand, giving the parties the ability to choose an arbitrator (or 
panel of arbitrators) to oversee the case may provide both specialized expertise 
and reassurance to tribal debtors that they will have a role in selecting their 
adjudicator. There may also be efficiencies in the arbitration process that are 
harder to match in a more traditional courtroom setting.271  
2. Process and Benefits 
The process for creating this specialized tribal bankruptcy law is as 
important as the substance of the law itself. Although this Article has set forth 
recommended features, the exact contours of the legislation should be defined 
in consultation with the parties that the legislation is designed to impact—
namely, tribes, tribal businesses, and non-tribal entities that play a significant 
role in tribal commerce.272 The Bureau of Indian Affairs, a federal agency tasked 
with partnering with Indian nations to “help them achieve their goals for self-
determination,”273 would also likely play a role in shaping the new legislation.274 
A collaborative process for drafting the proposed legislation minimizes the risk 
 
international arbitration is gradually becoming an option for addressing claims arising from sovereign debt 
defaults.”); see Christoph G. Paulus, A Standing Arbitral Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTDEBTDEPT/Resources/468980-1238442914363/5969985-1295539401520/9780821384831_ch13.pdf 
(discussing a proposal for the creation of a sovereign debt arbitral tribunal). 
 270 See also Laura N. Coordes, Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1249 (cautioning that, 
despite facial limitations on judicial power in chapter 9 cases, judges exert substantial influence and control over 
a case through the use of appointed experts). 
 271 See Melika Hadziomerovic, Note, An Arbitral Solution: A Private Law Alternative to Bankruptcy for 
Puerto Rico, Territories, and Sovereign Nations, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263, 1285-86 (2017) (noting the 
“considerable” “time and cost efficiencies of arbitration”). 
 272 For a discussion of the history and practice of consultation and consent in relations between American 
Indian nations and the United States, see Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States’ Duty to 
Confer With American Indian Governments, 91 N.D.L. REV. 37 (2015). 
 273 Mission Statement, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/bia (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
 274 Involving the Bureau of Indian Affairs, while politically likely, may raise its own concerns. See 
Haddock & Miller, supra note 51, at 175 (“Indians would benefit from a reduction in oversight from Washington 
that would place them on a footing with other citizens.”). 
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of the new law being perceived as forced upon tribal entities without their input 
or consent.275 
Although it may be possible to amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow tribal 
entities to use it, an advantage of special legislation is that it could be drafted 
specifically to take account of tribes’ unique status and the extensive legal, 
regulatory, and policy frameworks surrounding tribal entities. By building 
legislation from the ground up, Congress could accommodate the unique needs 
of these quasi-sovereign, heavily regulated entities—needs not currently 
contemplated anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code.  
Creation of a new law requires significant time and effort—and complying 
with that new law may also require time and money.276 Yet, Congress need not 
start completely from scratch. Legislators can and should draw upon existing 
bankruptcy law, tribal law, and sovereign debt restructuring practices to create 
structured debt relief for tribes, much in the way Congress drew from multiple 
restructuring techniques when it drafted PROMESA.277 In addition, by putting 
effort in to enact a law before a crisis hits and immediate action becomes 
necessary, Congress can ensure that affected parties have time to react to the 
effects of the legislation before dire need for relief is demonstrated. 
Encouraging action before a crisis is one of the primary challenges in 
bankruptcy law.278 As the experiences with PROMESA and Dodd-Frank 
illuminate, relief sometimes appears either just before or even after a crisis has 
reached a breaking point.279 Given the extent of tribal entities’ engagement in 
commerce, it seems likely if not certain that the next recession or financial 
downturn will affect tribal entities, causing them to look for debt relief. Acting 
now, before a wave of tribal bankruptcies creates uncertainty and instability for 
Indian nations and the entities that do business with them, can help ensure that 
when tribal debtors seek bankruptcy relief, adequate, timely relief will be 
 
 275 This risk is coming to fruition in Puerto Rico, where citizens have protested against PROMESA’s 
oversight board. See Edwin Melendez, Is Congress’ Plan to Save Puerto Rico Working?, THE CONVERSATION, 
July 31, 2017, https://theconversation.com/is-congress-plan-to-save-puerto-rico-working-80785. 
 276 See, e.g., Kolhatkar, supra note 202 (discussing the numerous experts Puerto Rico’s oversight board 
hired to assist it with interpreting and carrying out the provisions of PROMESA). 
 277 See David Skeel, Reflections on Two Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REVISTA JURIDICA UPR 862 (2018). 
 278 See, e.g., Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong, supra note 11, at 1214 (discussing literature describing 
government “officials . . . delay[ing] bankruptcy relief or avoid[ing] it entirely”). 
 279 Such hasty relief sometimes results in a suboptimal framework. See David A. Skeel, “Single Point of 
Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative” in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 313, 314 (Martin N. Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014) (contrasting the Title II process Congress devised 
in Dodd-Frank with the single point of entry strategy regulators actually use to implement a Title II resolution). 
COORDESPROOFS_7.2.19 7/2/2019 1:58 PM 
2019] BEYOND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 409 
available to them. In addition, Congress can avoid possible negative effects of 
hastily-enacted legislation.280 
Developing unique legislation tailored to tribal debtors may work well for 
several additional reasons. First, as previously discussed, reconciling the 
Bankruptcy Code with other laws governing tribes would be a complex and 
difficult task. Puerto Rico’s experience provides a telling illustration of just how 
difficult an undertaking this might be. Although many believed that Puerto 
Rico’s municipalities might be eligible for debt relief under chapter 9 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the territory itself had substantial debt that would not have 
been addressed even if its instrumentalities were deemed eligible for chapter 
9.281 Similarly, “tribal debt” may take the form of debt owed by a tribe or by a 
tribal corporation. As complex and difficult as enacting new legislation would 
be, a specialized bankruptcy law would likely be a better fit given potential 
multiple layers of debt for tribal entities. Further, as discussed, merely amending 
the Bankruptcy Code to make tribal debtors eligible for bankruptcy would not 
resolve the numerous conflicts with the IGRA, tribal law and customs, and other 
federal laws and policies applicable to tribes. 
PROMESA is an example of how legislation can be tailored to address a 
prospective debtor’s unique needs.282 Yet, observers have expressed concern 
that Congress, in imposing extensive external oversight as a condition of debt 
relief, has gone a step too far. Seeking input from critical potential players in a 
tribal bankruptcy may help address this concern in the context of a tribal 
bankruptcy law. Notably, involving Indian nations in the deliberative process 
may help tribal entities accept the new law and be more willing to use it in times 
of distress.283 
 
 280 See John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1 N.Y.U. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 
163, 173 (1997) (noting that “a lack of deliberation, a lack of careful drafting, and the inability to ascertain the 
people’s intent characterize statutes that are hastily enacted by the legislature”). 
 281 Jose A. Cabranes, 3 Main Reasons Why Puerto Rico Can’t Declare Bankruptcy, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
July 22, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/3-main-reasons-why-puerto-rico-cant-declare-bankruptcy-
2015-7 (noting that an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code would have addressed less than half of Puerto Rico’s 
total debt, leaving the island with “crippling payments” on the other two-thirds of its debt and smothering 
economic growth). 
 282 Patricia Guadalupe, Here’s How PROMESA Aims to Tackle Puerto Rico’s Debt, NBC NEWS, June 30, 
2016, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/here-s-how-promesa-aims-tackle-puerto-rico-s-debt-n601741. 
 283 See Joel Brockner, Why It’s So Hard to Be Fair, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2006 (proposing that 
companies pay more attention to stakeholders’ needs when undergoing change); Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate 
Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. 1715 (2018) (arguing that there is “a strong public interest in 
understanding who makes the key decisions [in bankruptcy] and whether that process comports with basic 
constitutional and democratic norms”). 
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B. Concerns 
Specialized bankruptcy legislation for tribal entities comes with its share of 
trade-offs. As discussed, starting from “scratch” may be a more expensive and 
uncertain process than amending existing law. Yet, if tribal entities are to have 
access to structured debt relief, the process of providing that relief will be a 
difficult one no matter the route that is taken. Amending the Bankruptcy Code 
to accommodate tribal debtors would require sorting out and resolving the 
various conflicts between the Code and other laws and policies that apply to 
tribes. Simply ignoring the problem and allowing the Bankruptcy Code to 
continue to apply as-is to tribal debtors is unworkable and would prevent 
bankruptcy’s rules from applying neutrally and predictably.284 By contrast, 
creating new legislation allows Congress to avoid conflicts at the outset and 
signals that tribal entities are distinct, in many ways, from other debtors. 
Although creating and implementing a new system is costly, leaving tribal 
debtors to navigate an ill-fitting bankruptcy system imposes its own significant 
costs. In the long run, having a system that works for tribal debtors and that 
addresses the concerns and needs of those affected will ideally provide more 
efficient results than the status quo. 
Another concern may arise from Congress’s constitutional directive to create 
“uniform” laws on the subject of bankruptcies.285 Although there is room for 
debate on what exactly this requires, scholars and jurists have interpreted this 
provision of the Constitution to prohibit “private” bankruptcy laws that affect 
only particular debtors.286 Furthermore, in Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 
the Supreme Court stated that laws passed on the subject of bankruptcy must be 
uniform throughout the United States, but that uniformity is geographical rather 
than personal.287 This means that the general operation of bankruptcy law must 
be uniform even though it may result in particular differences in different states. 
Thus, while diversity in local law inevitably produces non-uniform results in 
 
 284 See Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 
Feb. 6, 2018, available at SSRN (arguing that financial institution bankruptcy is “not workable as a restructuring 
system” and would “undermine the credibility of the bankruptcy system writ large” if attempted, despite 
acknowledging that bankruptcy offers the appearance of “neutral,” “predictable,” and “generally applicable” 
rules). 
 285 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 286 Todd Zywicki, Bankruptcy Clause, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION, https://www. 
heritage.org/constitution/articles/1/essays/41/bankruptcy-clause; see Lubben, supra note 234, at 53 (“What it 
means for a bankruptcy law to be uniform is massively unclear.”). 
 287 Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902). 
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bankruptcy cases in different states, this outcome does not contravene the 
uniformity requirement.288 
Legal arguments notwithstanding, uniformity is also valuable from a policy 
perspective. Generally applicable laws, whereby debtors and creditors receive 
the same treatment, create predictability and certainty and contribute to a 
perception of overall fairness in the bankruptcy system. Special legislation, as 
suggested above for tribal debtors, pushes against the policy benefits of 
uniformity. 
In the context of tribal entities, however, uniformity with other types of 
debtors seems inapt. As discussed above, tribes are sovereign entities that seem 
to fall outside of the scope of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, Article I, Section 
8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall have the power to 
regulate Commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with 
the Indian tribes.”289 This indicates that Indian nations were (and should be) 
considered separate from the federal government, the states, and foreign 
nations—they are, essentially, in a class by themselves.290 Indeed, as Part I 
illustrates, tribal entities are often given special treatment outside of the 
bankruptcy context to encourage business development. This warrants separate 
legislation—legislation that would apply uniformly to Indian nations as a class 
of debtor.  
If Congress does not act pursuant to its Bankruptcy Clause authority, it could 
perhaps draw upon other sources of authority to enact the proposed 
legislation.291 The Plenary Power Doctrine gives Congress ultimate authority 
with regard to matters affecting Indian tribes.292 There is also a trust relationship 
 
 288 Brian A. Blum, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR/CREDITOR 84 (5th ed.) 
(Aspen 2010). 
 289 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (emphasis added). 
 290 See also Lubben, supra note 234, at 58 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding in a uniformity case 
as providing “Congress with the ability to enact laws dealing with geographically isolated problems, as long as 
the law operates uniformly upon a given class of creditors and debtors”) (emphasis added). 
 291 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 5.01 (“Congress’s power to give effect to [the Constitution’s 
Indian commerce clause and treaty clause], coupled with the supremacy of federal law provides ample support 
for the federal regulation of Indian affairs.”). 
 292 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function of the 
Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”); 
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to 
legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”); 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians 
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not 
subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.”); Darrel Smith, Why Indians are Second 
Class Citizens: Congress’ Plenary Power, Tribal Sovereignty and Constitutional Rights, CITIZENS EQUAL 
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between the federal government and the tribes,293 which implies that the federal 
government has a duty to protect tribes. This in turn implies the necessary 
legislative and executive authorities to effectuate that duty.294 As noted above, 
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution explicitly provides that Congress’s 
power to regulate commerce extends to “[c]ommerce . . . with the Indian tribes” 
rather than commerce within the tribes.295 Accordingly, any bankruptcy-related 
law that Congress enacts should deal only with situations in which debt problems 
extend beyond the tribe itself. If a tribe’s financial distress is contained within 
the tribe (i.e., all involved are members of the tribe or otherwise affiliated with 
the tribe), Indian nations can and should address that distress using tribal law. 
Thus, it is likely that Congress has the authority to enact specialized 
bankruptcy legislation for tribal entities, given their unique status under U.S. 
law. Separate, specialized legislation for tribes would not impact the uniformity 
requirement because the same law would be applied equally to all tribal 
entities.296  
It is also important to recognize that tribes and tribal businesses are distinct, 
not just from non-tribal entities, but from each other. The collaborative process 
this Article proposes for creating the legislation should seek input from a wide 
range of tribal entities and creditors, as well as experts, legislators, and other 
policymakers. But involving so many entities in the creation of legislation risks 
fostering disagreement that could slow down or halt the process. To facilitate 
progress and ensure that the legislation is completed in a timely manner, the 
process for getting input could be based on other, similar processes that have 
resulted in effective legislation in the past, such as the process used to create the 




 293 Stephen L. Pevar, The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship: Its Origin, Nature, and Scope, 
www.saige.org/conf/12CO/TrustResponsibilityOutline%20SAIGE2012.doc. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 69, at § 5.01 (noting that the Indian commerce clause recognizes tribes 
“as distinct political entities” and that the clause is “broader in scope” than the portion of the commerce clause 
dealing with interstate commerce); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) (“The power of 
establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce . . . that the 
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question.”); but see Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 
U.S. 457, 469 (1982) (cautioning that Congress may not enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws under the Commerce 
Clause). 
 296 Kurt H. Nadelmann, On the Origin of the Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 215, 227 (1957) 
(“[I]t is no accident, we think, that the Bankruptcy Clause speaks of ‘uniform laws,’ rather than one ‘uniform 
law,’ which Congress may pass on the subject of bankruptcies, thus leaving Congress a free hand in adopting, if 
it so desired, different laws for different types of debtors.”). 
 297 See Part I.C, supra. 
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Institute uses to promulgate suggestions for improvements to the Bankruptcy 
Code.298 Some amount of compromise will be inevitable in this process, but a 
collaborative product will help to ensure that tribal entities are not coerced into 
becoming debtors in a system they do not want or need. 
Allowing the parties affected by the legislation to have a say in the drafting 
process, while democratic, may have other significant downsides. Lobbyists for 
various sides may battle for influence, and the resulting legislation risks 
mirroring the preferences of the wealthiest and/or loudest voices. Despite these 
potential drawbacks, history has demonstrated that it is possible for a 
collaborative, inclusive drafting process to achieve satisfactory results. The 
Bankruptcy Code itself is the result of an extensive, collaborative effort 
involving multiple parties with diverse viewpoints.299  
Another prominent example of such a process was the one leading to passage 
of the ANCSA. The Alaska Federation of Natives, a coalition of “more than 400 
Alaska Natives representing 17 Native organizations,” was formed to address 
issues with the land rights of Alaska Natives and was extremely involved in 
passage of the ANCSA, as well as in providing assistance with implementation 
of and subsequent amendments to the Act.300 Although the resulting legislation 
was not perfect, it received substantial support on both sides of the political 
aisle.301 The process leading to the ANCSA’s passage thus illustrates that there 
are ways to overcome deadlock and ways to work with those most affected under 
the proposed legislation to achieve a result that is workable and satisfactory. 
Whether through the development of a coalition interested in bankruptcy issues 
for tribal debtors, or through some other means, it is possible for the pitfalls of 
the drafting process to be minimized. 
There may be also concerns that treating tribal debtors differently may 
disadvantage Indian nations and their citizens by subjecting them to different 
standards than non-tribal entities. These concerns have arisen in other contexts 
 
 298 Purpose of the Commission, ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, 
http://commission.abi.org/purpose-commission (last visited Feb. 26, 2018); The ABI Commission on Consumer 
Bankruptcy, ABI COMMISSION ON CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY, https://consumercommission.abi.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2018). 
 299 See RONALD J. MANN, BANKRUPTCY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 24–25 (Cambridge University 
Press 2017) (“[T]he Code was not produced by the partisan designs of a single party or drafted to satisfy the 
interests of particular businesses.”). 
 300 History, ALASKA FEDERATION OF NATIVES, http://www.nativefederation.org/about-afn/history/ (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2018). 
 301 See Eric F. Myers, Letter to Rep. Don Young, AUDUBON ALASKA (May 15, 2013), 
http://docs.audubon.org/sites/default/files/documents/representative_young_-_sealaska_hr_740_5-15-13_final. 
pdf. 
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where special legislation has been passed that uniquely applies to tribes. For 
example, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)302 sets distinct federal 
requirements that apply only to state child custody proceedings involving Indian 
children.303 Critics of the ICWA have asserted that it violates the equal 
protection rights of parents of Indian children by treating them differently from 
other parents.304 Indeed, the ICWA is a “dramatic departure” from most state 
laws involving child custody proceedings and requires significant procedural 
and substantive differences from a non-Indian child custody proceeding.305 Like 
this Article’s proposed legislation, the ICWA was passed in part because of 
concerns about non-Indian actors failing to appreciate the differences between 
Indian and non-Indian practices.306 Although the ICWA has “brought attention 
to the unique needs of Indian children,”307 its critics contend that the Act also 
took away significant personal liberties.308  
Experience with the ICWA thus demonstrates both the benefits of special 
legislation in the sense that it can address unique needs and situations, as well as 
the drawbacks, in the sense that the effects of different treatment may bring 
disadvantages. For this reason, care should be taken to ensure, as much as 
possible, that bankruptcy legislation for tribes does not result in inherently 
unequal treatment or put Indian nations, their citizens, or their creditors at a 
disadvantage solely because of the fact that the debtor is a tribal entity. Involving 
tribal entities, creditors, and other representatives in the drafting process, as 
described above, and ensuring that drafters are given the time necessary to solicit 
feedback and input on the legislation will be critical to ensuring that the 
proposed legislation does not have overly adverse results. 
Ultimately, this proposal does treat tribal entities differently than other 
debtors. However, as described in Part I, tribal entities are given different 
treatment in nearly every other commercial respect, and there is a long history 
in U.S. law of distinct treatment of Indian affairs.309 This different treatment has 
 
 302 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. 
 303 About ICWA, NICWA, https://www.nicwa.org/about-icwa/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
 304 Christine D. Bakeis, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Violating Personal Rights for the Sake of 
the Tribe, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 543, 543-45 (1996). 
 305 B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act: The Need for a Separate Law, AMERICANBAR, 
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/indi
anchildwelfareact.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Bakeis, supra note 304, at 544. 
 309 See generally Miller, supra note 16 (exploring the federal government’s different treatment of 
reservation economies compared with the capitalism principles it applies to the rest of the American economy). 
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been upheld in the courts as based on tribes’ unique political status.310 More 
specifically, the fact that a tribal debtor experiences financial distress—even the 
same type of distress as a non-tribal debtor—does not mean that tribal debtors 
should be expected to conform to the same bankruptcy laws as non-tribal entities 
when those bankruptcy laws are an ill fit.  
CONCLUSION: A BROADER PERSPECTIVE 
In recent years, Congress has taken the unusual step of creating bankruptcy-
like laws tailored to address the unique, complex difficulties of special types of 
prospective debtors. This Article suggests that Congress could do the same for 
Native American tribal entities, which are distinctly situated and have 
effectively been barred from traditional bankruptcy relief. This Article thus 
reinforces the notion that, in certain circumstances, access to key debt 
restructuring tools does not have to come through the Bankruptcy Code itself. 
If Congress provides tribal entities with their own debt restructuring 
legislation, it could represent a broadening of U.S. bankruptcy law, as well as a 
fragmenting of the Bankruptcy Code. As debt structures become increasingly 
complex311 and as U.S. states face their own staggering debt problems,312 it may 
be desirable for Congress to pass new legislation uniquely tailored to address 
issues and entities independently of the Bankruptcy Code. Technological 
developments have also created new potential debtors,313 along with assets, such 
 
 310 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding statutory hiring preference in the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs because the intent was to aid Indian self-government); Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Jud. 
Dist. Of Mont., in and for Rosebud Cty., 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (“[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding 
occasionally results in denying an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such disparate 
treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering 
the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding 
that statutes providing for prosecution of Indians under federal criminal law due to their enrollment in federally 
recognized tribes do not violate due process or equal protection). 
 311 See, e.g., Puerto Rico’s complex debt, discussed in Part II.B.1 supra. 
 312 See, e.g., 10 States With Enormous Debt Problems: Report, HUFFPOST (Oct. 28, 2012), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/state-debt-report_n_1836603.html (noting that collectively, America’s state 
governments owe $4.19 trillion); see also Gulati & Rasmussen, supra note 165, at 136 (discussing state debt 
restructuring and “argu[ing] that while Congress can adjust [the power of states to restructure their debt] by 
replacing a state’s scheme with one of its own, it cannot, consistent with federalism, prohibit state action while 
putting nothing in its place.”). 
 313 For example, Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in Japan in 2014. Patrick Riesterer & 
Waleed Malik, Recognizing Foreign Proceedings Under the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act: Re 
MtGox Co, WEIL BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Nov. 24, 2014), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/ 
international/recognizing-foreign-proceedings-under-the-canadian-bankruptcy-and-insolvency-act-re-mtgox-
co/. For other examples of new debtor types, including high-technology companies and organizations that exist 
entirely online, as well as a discussion of the difficulty of the Code accommodating these entities, see Laura N. 
Coordes, New Rules for a New World: How Technology and Globalization Shape Bankruptcy Venue Decisions, 
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as cryptocurrencies, that simply did not exist when the Code was created.314 Seen 
in this light, the Bankruptcy Code is not a static set of tools but rather a launching 
pad for new ideas. If bankruptcy relief continues to be broadened beyond the 
Bankruptcy Code itself, further research will be necessary to determine the role 
of the Bankruptcy Code in the future, and in particular to examine the question 
of when it is appropriate or necessary to create “personalized,” non-Code-based 
structured debt relief. Although this Article does not seek to resolve these issues 
in a conclusory fashion, it does shed some light on their answers. When an entity, 
be it an Indian tribe, a bank, or a U.S. territory, exhibits distinct differences in 
structure and function from other entities contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code 
and experiences the need for bankruptcy-specific tools, special legislation may 
be warranted. If there are ways to replicate the pattern of providing tailored 
bankruptcy relief to nontraditional debtor entities, there are likely many 
prospective debtors that would benefit. 
 
 
17 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 85, 93–95 (2017). 
 314 See Coordes, New Rules, supra note 313, at 93.  
